Urban renewal in Hong Kong : a study of governance and policy tools by Chow, Tsuen-ming et al.
Title Urban renewal in Hong Kong : a study of governance and policytools
Author(s) Chan, Ka-bik; Chow, Tsuen-ming; Lee, Nga-kwan
Citation
Chan, K. R., Chow, T. A., Lee, N. K.. (2015). Urban renewal in
Hong Kong : a study of governance and policy tools. (Thesis).
University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR.
Issued Date 2015
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/223421
Rights
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.; The
author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent rights) and
the right to use in future works.
  
 
 
 
 
Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: 
 
A Study of Governance and Policy Tools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chan Ka Bik, Rebecca  (UID : 2013932393) 
 
Chow Tsuen Ming, Anita            (UID : 2006072421) 
 
  Lee Nga Kwan, Karen  (UID : 2013933945) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capstone Project Report submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements of the Master of Public Administration  
 
Department of Politics and Public Administration  
The University of Hong Kong 
 
2015 
Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: A study of Governance and Policy Tools  
 2 
 
DECLARATION 
 
We declare that this Capstone Project Report, entitled Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: A 
study of Governance and Policy Tools, represents our own work, except where due 
acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis, 
dissertation or report submitted to this University or any other institution for a degree, 
diploma or other qualification.  
 
 
         ( Signed ) 
        Chan Ka Bik, Rebecca 
 
        Chow Tsuen Ming, Anita 
 
        Lee Nga Kwan, Karen 
  
Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: A study of Governance and Policy Tools  
 3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to our supervisor, Prof Ian 
THYNNE, who has been providing much valuable guidance and support to this group 
throughout the year and enlightened us to develop a meaningful pathway in the 
intellectual journey of writing up this capstone project. 
 
We would also take this opportunity to thank our lecturers and other staff 
members of the Master of Public Administration for the sincere and inspiring teaching in 
the past two years. Last but not least, we are deeply grateful for our classmates, families 
and friends who have been providing unfailing support and tolerance all the time.  
  
  
Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: A study of Governance and Policy Tools  
 4 
 
Abstract 
The urban decay problem of Hong Kong has lasted for decades and it has become 
more serious day by day.  The tragic collapse of a building in Ma Tau Wai Road on 29 
January 2010, which had taken four lives and seriously injured two residents, revealed 
the severity of the problem. The alarming risk concerning life and death and sustainable 
development of the city requires appropriate actions to tackle the problem. 
 
 Noting the increasing severity of the problem, the Hong Kong government was 
observed to have changed its patterns of governance from private self-governance to 
enhanced hierarchical involvement by setting up statutory bodies in charge of urban 
renewal. The LDC was first set up as an organizational tool in 1988, and it was replaced 
by the URA established in 2001 with a view to expedite the urban renewal process. 
Nevertheless, even the URA has been granted more resources and guided by increased 
duties,  the pace of urban renewal is still unsatisfactory.   
 
 In this context, this project looks into how the governance model and policy tools 
URA employs affect its capacity to delivery urban renewal.  An analytical framework 
comprising Knill and Tosun’s four ideal types of governance, Hood’s NATO scheme and 
Vedung, et al’s categorisation of policy tools has been established to structure and guide 
the analysis.  While Knill and Tosun’s governance model would be used to analyse the 
change of governance model adopted by the government, the NATO scheme and 
Vedung’s “Carrots, Sticks and Sermons” policy tools categorisation would be used to 
analyse the policy tools adopted by the government and also the URA in the delivery of 
urban renewal.  The analysis on governance model and policy tools enables the 
evaluation on the effectiveness on various tools employed to deliver urban renewal.  
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
Focus, Objectives and Background 
 
This project focuses on the role of government in addressing the need for urban 
renewal in Hong Kong from the perspectives of governance model and use of policy 
tools. The objective of this project is to look into how the Hong Kong government has 
been developing policy tools to facilitate urban renewal to tackle urban decay being 
faced by the city, mainly by setting up statutory organization as the Urban Renewal 
Authority (URA) as the executive body. Through learning about the capacity and 
constraints of the URA, studying the effectiveness of policy tools as well as the 
governance model adopted in urban renewal, the project hopes to bring about the 
importance of repositioning the URA and persistent government commitment in order 
to deliver more effective urban renewal in Hong Kong. 
 
Like many other postwar developed cities, the built environment in Hong Kong 
has been aging since approaching the end of last century. With scarce land resources, the 
city landscape of Hong Kong is not only featured with skyscrapers and luxurious housing, 
but also densely built several-storey tenements known as ‘tong lau’ with dilapidated 
building conditions. Today there are about 4000 buildings aged over 50 years, which 
were mostly erected in the 1950s and 1960s to meet the intense housing and 
development pressure arisen from huge increase of population after the Second World 
War. However, the general quality of buildings completed during that period was not 
high as it was not designed for long life span and some of them were substandard that 
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even sand and sea water was found to have been used for construction. This has paved 
the way for the sprawl of urban decay in Hong Kong as time goes by.  
 
Poor living conditions in old buildings would put the lives of residents at risk. At 
the same time, Hong Kong always has pressing needs for provision of more housing for 
ever-increasing population. Given limited supply of land available for new residential 
development, vertical sprawl for living spaces are common in the city. To look for more 
housing units with improved facilities, those several-storey ‘tong lau’ without elevators 
become targets of redevelopment in order to release room for taller buildings that 
would better utilize the plot ratio. In short, Hong Kong needs urban renewal. 
 
At first the Hong Kong Government in colonial days did not take the lead in 
promoting urban renewal. When the pace of redevelopment initiated by the private 
sector was found to be too slow in the 1980s, the government set up a statutory 
organization named the Land Development Corporation (LDC) in 1988 to take part in 
selection and execution of urban renewal projects in collaboration with private 
developers. Though the LDC successfully completed a number of redevelopment 
projects, it had experienced difficulties in pursuing redevelopment programme 
including financial viability of redevelopment projects, prolonged land assembly 
processes and shortage of rehousing resources. The slow progress of urban renewal and 
the continuing worsening built environment in the city drove the government to make a 
more efficacious legislation in 2000 that established another statutory organization as 
the Urban Renewal Authority (URA) in 2001 to replace the LDC as the main executive 
agency to carry out urban renewal in Hong Kong. 
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Urban Renewal is more than ‘slash and burn’ of old dilapidated buildings. As set 
out in the Urban Renewal Strategy (URS) promulgated by the government, urban 
renewal shall consist of the “4R” elements, i.e. Redevelopment, Rehabilitation, 
Revitalization and pReservation. The URA carries both official and public expectation to 
achieve the principal mission of bringing about effective urban renewal to improve 
living environment of Hong Kong people and prevent further urban decay, adopting a 
wide array of measures given the authorities and resources available to it. 
 
The road to urban renewal is long and winding with obstacles. The H15 Project in 
Lee Tung Street announced in 2004 faced strong opposition from the community, and 
this saga has triggered socio-political tension in taking forward other redevelopment 
projects. The URA has been often criticized as destroying community fabrics and 
livelihood, ignoring the interests of affected tenants and colluding private developers to 
claim land for lucrative property development. On the other hand, the stagnant progress 
of various URA projects has dragged its financial position to operating deficit in the 
recent financial year and the status quo has alarmed the management of URA. Against 
this background and in the midst of searching for a sustainable way out to carry on 
urban renewal in Hong Kong, this project tries to discuss the effectiveness of URA as a 
major policy tool of the government as well as user of tools in advancing urban renewal 
under the current political, economic and social context. 
 
Research Questions and Related Propositions: Theory and Practice 
 
 
In studying the URA’s expected and actual performance in promoting urban renewal 
in Hong Kong, the following research questions provide guidance to explore how 
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governance and policy tools affect the URA’s ability to accomplish the complex task to 
tackle urban decay: 
 
1. What governance approaches and policy tools are available to governments for 
addressing the needs of urban renewal? 
2. Why was the URA chosen by the HKSAR government as a tool for delivering 
urban renewal in Hong Kong? 
3. How has the governance and governance initiatives of the URA affected its 
capacity, obligations and competencies in delivering urban renewal in Hong 
Kong? 
4. Has the URA been given and adopted appropriate tools to promote and facilitate 
urban renewal in Hong Kong? 
 
Given a range of hierarchical and non-hierarchical governance approaches 
available to governments in carrying out urban renewal with different levels of 
involvement by private actors, the Hong Kong government did not actively respond to 
urban renewal until the 1980s when market forces failed to address the problem of urban 
decay which went beyond economic nature. The government increased its role and 
allocation of resources in urban renewal by forming a statutory organization as the LDC in 
1988, which was transformed into the URA in 2001. The government considered that the 
LDC and the URA in the form of a quasi-governmental statutory body would be an 
appropriate tool for both facilitating and regulating the pace of urban renewal. This 
arrangement was seen to be favourable in entitling extra capacities and competencies to 
the organization to realise the public vision that traditional government departments may 
be less efficient or flexible in the delivery of goods and services. 
 
Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: A study of Governance and Policy Tools  
 12 
 
The URA has been utilising its resources to generate an array of administrative, 
financial and informative instruments to operate according to the government’s official 
strategy in urban renewal. However, the capacities and competencies possessed by the 
URA are caught by limitations and do not promise effective use of its powers in delivering 
its goals. Despite the efforts, the rate of urban renewal has not increased significantly 
since the presence of the URA in 2001. The URA is also repeatedly being criticised for its 
concerns for profitability of its projects over improving quality of life of affected citizens 
and benefit the wider community that was set out in its mission. The incapability of the 
URA in adopting policy tools effectively could be attributed to the imbalanced assignment 
of resources and responsibilities by the government to authority. When the URA becomes 
overloaded and underperformed, it is time for the government to consider reviewing its 
role and reposition the URA in the arduous work of urban renewal.     
 
Overview of the Analytical Framework 
 
 
Urban renewal is not only steered by a public policy but is also a dynamic mix of 
political, economic and social interactions among the state, the market and the civil 
society. Governance as an essential concept in public administration is adopted in this 
project as the analytical lens to begin the study of the government’s role in urban 
renewal in Hong Kong throughout the years. Knill and Tosun (2012) introduced four 
ideal types of governance, which varies in degree of legal obligation in organizing public 
actions and public-private cooperation in policy-making process, reflecting different 
approaches of a government in addressing different public issues, or a public issue over 
the time such as urban renewal.  
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Different governance patterns influence the selection of policy tools used by the 
government in achieving desired policy goals. An organisation embodies the nature as 
“dualistic tools” in which its existence as a tool of government can develop its own policy 
tools in operation. In assessing the types of tools that an organization can utilise, Vedung 
et al (1998)’s “carrots, sticks and sermons” classifications are taken into account. These 
ideas are valuably viewed as embracing features of Hood’s (2007) “toolkit” that 
comprises four categories of resources that governments can use for detecting and 
effecting functions, which are “nodality”, “authority”, “treasure” and “organization”. A 
government can create an organization as a policy tool and give it necessary resources in 
terms of information, authority and finance to address a public problem. These 
typologies of tools are used for analysis of how an organization is given tools and at the 
same time develops its tools following its governance mode.  
  
To put it in the context of urban renewal in Hong Kong, the analytical framework 
integrating types of governance and dualistic policy tools provides a clear and 
systematic approach to look into the change and continuity of the government’s roles 
and policy decisions in delivering urban renewal, facilitating the analysis of the 
effectiveness of current work of the URA as expected by the government from the 
perspectives of policy tools and governance. The framework eventually guides the 
search of directions that both the government and the URA shall seriously consider 
review and reform for better urban renewal in Hong Kong. Chapter 2 will provide details 
of the analytical framework. 
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Research Methodology 
 
 
In this project, literature review on the public administration theories of 
governance and policy tools is essential for developing the analytical framework. Efforts 
have also been made to find a collection of academic journals, scholarly articles and 
research reports regarding urban renewal in Hong Kong, which have given valuable 
insights for developing analytical approach in the study of this big and complicated 
policy topic.  
 
Throughout the project, desktop research has been conducted as the major 
research method. A thorough reading of published materials and media reports are 
required to gain a full picture of how has Hong Kong been going through its path in 
search of sustainable and improving living environment in the older urban areas. 
Nowadays as a large volume of primary and secondary sources could be accessed online, 
almost all of the needed useful information such as the ordinances, LegCo papers, media 
reports, annual reports and the website of the URA, the URS and its related reports 
during public consultation period for the new URS  have been found and read.  
 
The desktop research is considered suitable as it enables detailed empirical 
analysis without cost implications in collecting personal opinions through surveys or 
interviews. To ensure the analysis is done in an objective manner, case studies and 
empirical data obtained from stakeholders’ response to the URA proposals, media 
reports and LegCo papers provide a fair platform to examine whether the URA has been 
given and/or adopted the most appropriate tools under its powers to deliver its 
obligations to improve the quality of living and fight urban decay in Hong Kong.   
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Chapter Outline 
 
This project consists of six chapters including this first chapter. Chapter 2 sets 
out the analytical framework which addresses the first research question of what 
governance approaches and policy tools can governments consider to adopt in order to 
handle public problems such as urban decay and associated housing problems. Selected 
relevant concepts of governance and policy tools are linked up to form the analytical 
lens. Chapter 3 depicts the historical background for establishment of the URA in 2001 
as the major non-government public agency which is responsible for promoting urban 
renewal in Hong Kong, including the rise and fall of its predecessor, the LDC (1988-
2001). A change of governance pattern in urban renewal is reflected in the government’s 
decision to establish such a statutory body as a policy tool to achieve its desired policy 
goals. Chapter 4 takes a closer look at the nature of dualistic tools in URA, learning about 
the resources and obligations that the government has assigned to the URA as a policy 
tool for delivery of urban renewal, followed by examining the collection of policy tools 
that the URA invented and adopted in actual implementation of policy goals. Chapter 5 is 
assessment on the effectiveness of use of tools by the URA in making desired impact in 
promoting and facilitating urban renewal, and to what extent the government has 
enabled the URA with appropriate resources to accomplish its expected blueprint of 
urban renewal by the government. Selected initiatives such as the demand-led 
redevelopment projects are discussed in depth in assessing the partial success with 
limitations of the URA. The final chapter – chapter 6 – provides a summary of the 
observations and understanding of the role of the URA and the government in urban 
renewal, putting forward our concluding comments and room for thought and changes 
with the hope of better urban renewal in Hong Kong. 
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Chapter Two - Analytical Framework 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explains the analytical framework of this project, which 
incorporates the concepts of Governance and Policy tools in organizing public actions to 
achieve a policy goal.  Reference is made to Knill and Tosun (2012)’s literature in four 
ideal types of governance, which affects the choice of policy tools adopted by the 
government. Recognising the transformation of basic forms of modern governments 
which make use of more tools of pubic actions, this wide array of tools. Organization, as 
a policy tool of government, is capable of developing its own tools, thus raising the 
significance of organisations as “dualistic tools” in the sense of being and using tools at 
one and the same time. Vedung, et al  (1998)’s analysis of policy tools as “carrots, sticks 
and sermons” captures the different nature of tools available to an organization to 
deliver actions of public purpose. These ideas embody nodality, authority, treasure and 
organization known as NATO by Hood (2007).   
 
Types and Modes of Governance 
 
Governance is a big and complex concept in public administration. According to 
Knill and Tosun (2012), governance may generally refer to hierarchical and non-
hierarchical political steering to coordinate individual actions in order to achieve certain 
policy goals. Today, with the rising significance of non-government actors in addressing 
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public problems, the role of government and its extent of intervention in organizing 
public actions vary under different types of governance.  
 
Knill and Tosun (2012) put forward four ideal types of governance, which 
differences lay with the degree of cooperation between public and private actors in 
policy-making process, and the degree of legal obligation in collective problem-solving. 
Different types of governance are found in different governments and policy areas, 
which reflect the dominance of hierarchical mode of governance by state intervention in 
policy-making and market regulation, or non-hierarchical modes of governance by 
markets or policy networks consisting of public and private actors in varying 
cooperative relationship. 
 
Interventionist governance 
 
 
The first ideal type of governance refers to interventionist governance, where 
state actors play the most prominent role in decision making with little cooperation with 
private actors, and a high degree of legal obligation is observed. There is a hierarchical 
relationship between public and private actors, with top-down state intervention into 
society through command and control.  
 
Interventionist governance corresponds to the mode of governance by hierarchy, 
where the state plays the most important role in policy-making and put great emphasis 
on formal rules and procedures binding for both public and private sectors. The state 
can exercise hierarchical intervention over private actors in complying with public 
policies and provision of common goods such as infrastructure, policing and national 
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security. It can also refer to regulatory frameworks laid down by the government in 
governing market mechanisms.  
 
Regulated self-governance 
 
 
The second ideal type of governance is regulated self-governance, which still 
features strong hierarchical intervention and legal binding, but the public and private 
actors are in more cooperative relationships at policy making and implementation. For 
example, nowadays many public services could be jointly delivered by government and 
non-government agencies such as education and medical services. Private actors are 
bound by formalised and institutional procedures set by the government but to certain 
extent they are eligible to influence the formulation of related policies and the 
regulatory framework.  
 
When the state is no longer the sole actor in decision-making and execution of 
public actions and private actors are getting involved in collaboration with the 
government in different forms to achieve shared policy goals, this reflects the mode of 
governance by policy networks. In this mode, governments and policy networks can 
share and coordinate resources throughout policy making and implementation. Varying 
degree in different cases, decisions about development and implementation of public 
policy is negotiated instead of top-down imposition.  
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Cooperative governance 
 
 
If cooperative governance is adopted, policy decisions and arrangement are not 
based on legally binding requirements but through negotiations and voluntary 
agreements between public and private actors. Both actors participate on an equal 
standing, focusing on cooperation between state and society. This model is featured by 
active form of public-private partnership such as joint venture and the nature of state 
involvement would be more facilitating than coercive. Governance by strong networks 
could be observed under cooperative governance.  
 
Private self-governance 
 
 
When private actors are major agents to coordinate individual actions and state 
involvement becomes voluntary, private self-governance could be found, with both little 
cooperation of public and private actors and low degree of legal obligation. Provision of 
public good here depends on private actors and the government can complement 
governance by facilitation and acknowledgment.  
 
Even governance by markets is found where goods and services are allocated 
without government intervention, it would be assertive to conclude that private self-
governance means that hierarchy has been replaced by markets. Market governance 
would likely produce negative externalities to the society and state intervention is often 
needed as effective internalising and regulating agent. Under this type of non-
hierarchical mode of governance, the state still plays a role in the public domain and 
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governance is based on political steering by policy networks consisting of active private 
actors. 
 
The four ideal types of governance and three general modes of governance are 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Ideal Types of Governance and Modes of Governance 
Ideal Type of 
Governance 
degree of legal  
obligation/ 
state intervention 
degree of public-
private cooperation 
Mode of Governance 
Interventionst 
Governance 
High Low By Hierarchy 
Regulated Self-
governance 
High High By Networks (various 
of combination of 
public and private 
actors) 
Corporative 
Governance 
Low High 
Private Self-
governance 
Low Low 
Source: adapted from Knill & Tosun (2012:202-212) 
 
Changing Patterns of Governance and Tools of Government  
 
An overview 
 
Governance types and modes can vary in different governments and policy areas. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, world governments began to be doubted about the ability to 
deal with emerging complex social-economic problems, and the rise of new public 
management and privatisation in the 1980s led to the change of role of governments 
from hierarchical provision to establishing regulatory frameworks. Then since the 1990s, 
cooperative forms of public-private interactions in policy networks have become more 
significant.  
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Indeed, as Salamon (2002) observed, there has been transformation of the basic 
forms of government in many parts of the world over the past decades that besides 
traditional government agencies, a wide array of third parties have been participating in 
solving complex public problems collaboratively. More tools of public actions have been 
invented to address public problems, which are indirect in nature and are often used by 
those third parties assigned for public purposes. Some examples include loans, grants, 
contracts, regulation, insurance and vouchers.  Third parties such as statutory bodies are 
given discretion over the use of public authority and the spending of public funds so that 
many of new public programmes are now carried out by them rather than government 
agencies (Salamon, 2002:5). 
 
Different types of governance affects the choice of policy tools developed and 
adopted by the government to address public problems. Even in less hierarchical 
governance models, state involvement is still needed by means of top-down intervention 
or institutionalized forms of public-private cooperation. Since the choice of tools would 
affect policy results, governments have to make thorough considerations in deciding its 
policy tools.   
 
An organisation as a dualistic tool 
 
An organisation is a typical tool of the government on delivering its policy.  It 
refers to the stock of “land, buildings and equipment, and a collection of individuals with 
whatever skills and contacts they may have, in government’s direct possession” (Hood, 
2007).  It provides government with the capacity and capability to obtain information 
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from and to make an impact to the society.   
 
Vedung, et al  (1998) considered that organisation “is a pre-requisite for the 
application of policy instruments, not a policy instrument in itself.” (1998: 38).  In that 
sense, organisation in Vedung, et al’s view is an agent that can use different regulatory, 
economic and exhortatory policy instruments to perform its functions rather than an 
actual policy instrument in itself to shape and influence societal behaviours. 
Organisation is thus seen as a public governance strategy where it administrative body 
can be formed and reorganised as required to cover new and/ or arising issues and to 
suit the government’s direction of travel to enhance its functional effectiveness and to 
ensure public confidence. This interpretation also highlights the importance of 
developing an appropriate public policy to set up a suitable organisation structure to 
implement the policy instruments to satisfy the policy goals.  
 
There are different types of policy tools available for public policy managers to 
choose from in designing and developing their organisation’s policy toolkit to fulfil their 
mission and to implement the governemnt’s policies. Vedung, et al  (1998) regards these 
tools as ‘a set of techniques by which governmental authorities wield their power in 
attempting to ensure support and effect or prevent social change.’ Vedung, et al  sees 
that there are three main types of policy instruments authorities can capitalise on to 
bring about changes in behavior, namely carrots, sticks and sermons. 
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Carrots 
 
 
Carrots are economic/ financial instruments that involve either handing out or 
taking away of human and financial resources for specific purposes. They can be cash or 
in-kind and is usually used to provide incentives/ disincentives to support specific social 
and economic activities in society. Carrots correspond to Hood’s (2007) definition of 
‘Treasure’, where governments provide positive incentives or inducements to obtain 
information or to change behavior of individuals in society.  The government could 
simply obtain information from the soceity through offering positive incentive for 
people to provide information to the government.  It could also obtain information using 
its treasure, such as through organising focus group, surveys, etc.   To effect with 
treasure, the government could simply exchange its treasure for goods or services it 
requires (Hood, 2007). 
 
When used as incentives, carrots could encourage or promote certain activities 
that the government wants to encourage, particularly if they are in the form of grants, 
subsidy, earmarked funds, loans, seed money and seconded staff to encourage more of 
these activities to generate positive externalities. On the contrary, when the government 
wants to discourage or restrain certain activities carrots could be a good instrument to 
reduce the production of negative externalities in society, for instance by using penalties, 
tax, imposing tariffs and terminating certain programmes.  
 
Notwithstanding that, when the government employs carrots to resolve the 
public problem at hand, they are essentially giving the subjects of governance some 
leeway, or freedom, to choose whether they would take an action or not (Vedung, 1998). 
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These instruments could, however, have varying degrees of success on different actors 
in society, depending on whether the financial (dis)incentive is strong enough to 
promote/ deter the production of that particular externality the government wants to 
see behavior changes. With this in mind, “Carrots” may be most effective in enhancing 
cooperative governance and private-self governance as per Knill and Tosun’s 
governance types model, especially in situations where the government would like to 
use financial incentives to encourage collaboration between government-stakeholders 
and/ or stakeholders-stakeholders in the system to achieve its policy goals. Carrots will 
also be particularly effective where the government provides and manages incentives to 
stimulate bottom-up initiatves, or when the government would like to trial effects of 
different schemes before full implementation to explore whether the scheme will be 
efficient in the long run to promote behavioural changes in society. 
 
Sticks 
 
 
Sticks, as Vedung, et al (1998) explains, are regulatory instruments that are used 
by the government as legal tools to regulate social and market interactions. Sticks could 
be in the form of legal injunctions or legal measures that demand or prohibit certain 
actions in society and could exist in the form of directives, statues, laws, orders, 
ordinance, programme guidelines or endorsed board/committee documents.  
 
Vedung, et al’s definition of “Sticks” resembles well to “Authority” of Hood’s 
NATO scheme in which both policy instruments give authorities power to command and 
control.  According to Hood, “Authority” refers to the “ability to command and prohbit, 
commend and permit, through recognized procedures and identifying symbols” (Hood, 
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2007).  It is very common that the government uses its authority as an instrument to 
obtain information from the society and to make an impact to it. 
 
There are many ways which the government could make use of its authority to 
ask citizens to provide information and to notify government in certain circumstances, 
such as registration of births, death and marriages, tax returns, etc.  The most common 
instrument that a government uses to effect with authority is through the use of a token 
of authority.  Certificate as authoritative declaration about the properties of an 
individual, is perhaps the most common form of token of authority.   
 
The sanctioning and its power to impose are the most crucial properties of 
regulatory instrument and it can have major impact in shaping and influencing behavior 
and lead to changes in society. Nonetheless, as Sticks often appear in the form of legal 
documents, they are powerful agents in ensuring compliance as they are usually backed 
by threats or sanctions in non-compliance cases, such as economic sanctions, fine and 
even withdrawal of rights. Depending on the degree of non-compliance and the level of 
sanction that is granted by law, sticks can also bring about almost immediate effect on 
regulating social and market interactions and individual behavior and have an effect on 
production, allocation and use of resources (Frieberg 2010; Webb 2004; Doelen, 1998).  
 
Sticks are usually not the government’s preferred option in influencing behavior 
and choices of individuals and societies (Freiberg, 2010). Designing new “Sticks” could 
be costly and time inefficient, especially if it is controversial and would take a long time 
to consult, discuss, debate and resolve amongst the political actors. More importantly, 
governments will often avoid using “Sticks to encourage behavior change when she 
anticipate powerful stakeholder oppositions or when the power of non-governmental 
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actors are on the rise to drive opposition to the government’s policy or strategy. This 
nature makes Sticks an ideal tool to be used in situations where the government deems 
essential to intervene in the market, especially in regularising and formalising systems 
or frameworks in an attempt to change behaviours in society.  When considering Knill 
and Tosun’s ideal types of governance, “Sticks” appears to be effective when the 
government is keen promote/ enhance regulated self-governance in the system through 
hierarachical intervention and cooperation between actors. Nonetheless, “Sticks” will be 
most useful in extreme cases when the government wants to strengthen its intervention 
into the society through interventionist governance to reinfornce its command and 
control power in society.   
 
Sermons 
 
 
Sermons are another policy instrument, involving communication or information 
passing which are mainly used as “moral suasion” (Vedung, et al, 1998). As Vedung and 
Doelen highlighted (1998:193), sermons is restricted to “no more than pure transfer of 
knowledge, persuasive or reasoning, or exhortations… offered to influence the public or 
some segment of the public to do what government deems desirable”.  
 
This, again, is reminiscent to Nodality of the NATO scheme where authorities can 
use this power to enhance information collection and dissemination between the public 
and the organisations using the nodality position of the government. For example, 
information such as criticisms from the public would be given to the government by 
maintaining its central presence or through interactions with citizens.  On the other 
hand, the government could change behaviour of individuals through suppression of 
information, “disinformation” or unofficial “leakage” of information.   
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Sermons are more associated with different modes of communication between 
the government and its stakeholders rather than focusing on a more top-down approach 
to “effecting” the public, which includes authority-public and public-public level 
attempts to persuasion, negotiation, propaganda, advocacy, motivation and exhortation. 
Sermons are thus often considered the most lenient tool of the government as they do 
not contain mandatory rules of conduct but provides recommendation and judgments 
about how targets should behave (Vedung et al, 1998). From that perspective, “Sermons” 
can be an effective tool in promoting private self-governance between the stakeholders 
where “peer pressure” to conform to societal standards encourages them to change their 
behaviour for the better and gradually help to achieve the government’s policy goals.   
 
Nonetheless, sermons could be employed by the government as ‘soft instruments’ 
to foster communication and mutual exchange of information amongst actors, 
particularly to provide recommendations, appeals for acceptance or offer voluntary or 
contractual arrangements, such as code of conducts, voluntary agreements and 
contractual relations and public-private partnerships. The information conveyed 
through soft instruments may include arguments that may benefit targets materially 
from employing the measures recommended through the soft instruments, yet the 
government will not materially reward or deprive people who disregard the information. 
This makes “Sermons” the perfect tool for negotiation and to facilitate collaboration 
between differnet parties, especially when the government would like to foster 
cooperative governance as suggested by Knill and Tosun (2012) in the market to utilise 
the power of network governance in achieving its policy goals. 
 
Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: A study of Governance and Policy Tools  
 28 
Regardless of the type of governance they are most efficient in supporting, 
“Sermons” are increasingly popular as a policy tool of the government. It is more 
politically feasible than “Sticks” when the government prefers to promote changes that 
the government deems desirable but is not prepared to invest a significant amount of 
resources in its “Carrots” to advocate the changes in society. This makes Sermons a 
valuable tool when the government is keen to address more contentious issues but is 
concerned that the issue being dealt with has no viable choice for the government to act 
on without causing any controversy. In that context, “Sermons” can be a useful tool to be 
used alongside “Carrots” and/ or “Sticks” to complement its function to achieve the 
government’s intended policy goals.  
 
Criteria of Effective Policy Tools and Good Governance 
  
Given abundance of policy tools available to the government as put forward by 
scholars such as Hood and Vedung, at al not all the policy tools are appropriate in use 
and achieve the desirable policy results as expected. In assessment of tools of public 
interventions, Salamon (2000) identified the five criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, 
equity, manageability, and legitimacy and political feasibility.  
 
Effectiveness reflects the extent that a tool can achieve its intended objectives, 
while efficiency means achieving balance between benefits and costs. To evaluate the 
consequences of a tool, the level of fairness and redistribution determines its equity 
quality. In addition, a well-designed tool loses its significance when it lacks 
manageability, i.e. the level of ease of difficulty in implementation. Finally, when a tool or 
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a program lacks political support and legitimacy, its delivery would unlikely to be 
successful. 
 
In search of good governance, Knill and Tosun (2012) remarked that a necessary 
benchmark would be decision-making capacity of governments in public policies. In case 
a policy decision monopolized by the government would likely receive political 
resistance, delegation of competencies and authority to private actors in specific policies 
may reduce the difficulty in central governance. After introduction of a policy decision, 
whether it can be effectively implemented is equally important. Hierarchical 
intervention features strong ‘push factors’ from above, while private self-governance 
relies on ‘pull factors’ from societal actors. A balanced mix of both hierarchical ‘push’ 
and societal ‘pull’ could be found in regulated self-governance, bringing about more 
effective policy implementation.  Finally, democratic legitimacy including elements such 
as due process, accountability and participatory rights also affects the quality of 
governance. While the participation of policy networks in non-hierarchical types of 
governance seems to have raised societal representativeness, the access opportunities 
of different groups may be unequal in which certain stakeholders may be left out as 
outsiders.  
 
Concluding comments 
 
  
This chapter sets out the analytical framework for the studying how governance 
and policy tools impacts on the URA’s performance in delivering urban renewal. Knill 
and Tosun’s (2012) governance model and Vedung’s et al (1998) and Hood’s (2007) 
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policy tools theories sets a good foundation to guide and inform the empirical analysis in 
the subsequent chapters.  
 
Organisation, as a dualistic tool of the government, could develop or employ a 
range of tools to deliver policy measures.  These ranges of tools would be studied and 
analysed using Vedung, et al’s (1998) theory on Carrots, Sticks and Sermons so as to 
understand how policy tools are classified, package and chosen by public managers to 
deliver the policy goals. In an attempt to build an analytical lens to frame this research 
project, Vedung, at al (1998) and Hood’s (2007) policy tools theory is fitted into Knill 
and Tosun’s (2012) ideal types of governance for a preliminary assessment of the most 
effective tools to support the four governance mode. Salamon (2000)  and Knill and 
Tosun’s (2012) criteria for good policy tools and good governance also provide an 
effective framework for analysing whether the URA has been effective as a dualistic tool 
in adopting and using effective policy tools to deliver urban renewal in Hong Kong.  
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Chapter Three - Historical Development of Urban Renewal 
Authority 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Desirable living environment is essential to public citizens’ well-being and a city’s 
development. Like other developed areas in the world, Hong Kong has been facing 
growing needs for urban renewal over the past several decades. This chapter discusses 
the changing types of governance adopted by the government in urban renewal over the 
decades from reliance on self-governance by private actors towards increasing 
government involvement. In order to influence the pace and scope of redevelopment of 
older town areas, the government in the late 1980s decided to form a statutory body as 
organizational tool to take forward urban renewal projects, leading to the establishment 
of the LDC in 1988.  
 
When the LDC became burdened by operational difficulties and did not achieve 
targeted results, the government recognised the importance of developing a stronger 
policy tool in delivering urban renewal. Eventually the URA was set up in 2001 in 
replacement of the LDC as the government’s major tool in addressing urban decay 
problem, reflecting greater extent of hierarchical intervention in an indirect manner. 
 
Before the 1980s: Private Self-governance in Urban Redevelopment 
 
Urban renewal had not been on the government’s agenda until the 1980s. Before 
the 1980s, the colonial government showed no greater commitment to urban 
Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: A study of Governance and Policy Tools  
 32 
redevelopment than the private sector (Adams & Hastings, 2001).  Its major role in 
housing was the provision and management of public housing. It was observed that the 
government was playing “marginal role” (Ng, 2002) with “ad-hoc, half-hearted” (Ng, 
1998) intervention in redevelopment of private residential buildings. The minimum 
government commitment at early days was attributed to its adherence of positive non-
intervention principles in the market economy, and the considerably high cost in land 
acquisition of private buildings using public money was not preferred. Hence the 
government had been looking to the private developers to deal with owners for 
individual redevelopment projects.  
 
During this period, the government did not formulate official policy in urban 
renewal or show interest in seeking partnership with the private sector in 
redevelopment. This resembled the type of private self-governance by Knill and Tosun 
(2012) where the state adopted a hands-off approach and left to the private actors to be 
major agents to coordinate individual actions in redevelopment of non-public housing. 
There were few policy tools in controlling private redevelopment. 
 
Hastings and Adams (2001) and Ng (1998) identified key difficulties in previous 
redevelopment attempts prior to the establishment of the LDC in the late 1980s.  They 
included multiple ownership in private buildings, rehousing of affected occupiers and 
the absence of central coordinating authority. As acquisition of ownership interest could 
be protracted by shared ownership of one unit or even failure to identify or reach the 
owners, without the power of land resumption, private developers only aimed at 
redeveloping small-scale sites for highest possible buildings to maximize efficiency and 
profit, resulting in fragmented “pencil” or “toothpick” development in the old urban 
districts.  
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Since the 1980s, more and more buildings erected in the 1950s became aged and 
with deteriorating conditions. Many of these buildings situated at major town areas 
were several-storey tenements (known as “tong lau”) with no facilities.  At the same 
time, the ever-growing population in the city brought about rising demands for housing 
and this added pressure for urban redevelopment to better utilize plot ratio for building 
taller residential buildings with better quality. When the pace of redevelopment could 
not be estimated or accelerated by the government under the market-oriented mode of 
private self-governance, the colonial government recognised the need for planning 
urban redevelopment in the long run in order to provide sufficient living space for the 
citizens.   In other words, the government sought necessary instruments to take part in 
urban renewal. 
 
The MacLehose government launched the 10-year housing program in 1972 to 
boost supply of public housing and its growing commitment was reflected in significant 
expansion of civil service and public expenditure. Considering that popular demands for 
public rental housing was accompanied by rising public interest for home ownership in 
the 1980s, the government reviewed the direction of its housing policy and introduced 
its Long Term Housing Strategy in April 1987, stating that the government shall improve 
the residential living conditions by both redeveloping sub-standard older public housing 
estates and by encouraging redevelopment of older private housing through an agency 
named the Land Development Corporation (LDC) (Hong Kong Housing Authority, 1987). 
It revealed that the government decided to form an organization as its policy tool to 
expedite urban renewal. 
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The LDC (1988) as Organizational Tool: Enabling Cooperative Governance 
 
With the enactment of the Land Development Corporation Ordinance (LDCO) in 
December 1987, the LDC was established in January 1988. Clause 4 of LDCO states that  
its purpose was to “improve the standard of housing and the environment in Hong Kong 
by undertaking, encouraging, promoting and facilitating urban renewal.”  
 
The government decided to set up the LDC as an independent statutory body, 
because this enabled the government to minimise intervention in implementation as 
well as further financial burden. Established by a statute, it had rather stable existence 
with specific legal duties and authorities, and its operation would not be much restricted 
by bureaucracy. The incorporated LDC could exercise autonomy in staffing and 
contracting with private developers to jointly develop housing projects in a more 
efficient manner. In this way, the government created a formal organization as a policy 
tool to deal with the rising public problems of unsatisfactory housing supply and urban 
decay.  
 
The government formed the LDC with the objective of speeding up 
redevelopment of dilapidated urban districts. The LDC was tasked to select target sites 
for redevelopment and submit development schemes to seek approval of the then 
Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands (SPEL). SPEL would then submit the 
plans for the Town Planning Board (TPB)’s consideration. Upon approval by the TPB,  
the LDC could execute the projects by resuming property rights and partnering with 
private developers in the form of joint venture for construction and sale of new flats. In 
case the LDC encountered difficulties in resuming ownership of the subject site, it could 
apply to SPEL requesting him to recommend to the Governor/Chief Executive in Council 
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for land resumption under the (Crowns) Lands Resumption Ordinance (Clause 15 of 
LDCO). Approval of invoking land resumption would be based on the condition that the 
government was satisfied that the LDC has taken all reasonable steps to acquire the land 
including negotiation on fair and reasonable terms.  Government loan of $100 million 
was offered, while the LDC was required to conduct its business according to prudent 
commercial principles, unless approval was given by the Financial Secretary to engage in 
projects which were unlikely to be profitable (Clause 10(1) of LDCO). 
 
Since the formation of the LDC in 1988, the role of government in urban renewal 
changed from a passive third party to an active facilitator. The shift of governance model 
away from private self-governance towards cooperative governance in this policy arena 
was seen, since the enactment of the LDCO increased the level of legal obligation and the 
mode of redevelopment by joint venture between the LDC and private developers 
strengthened the level of public-private cooperation.  
 
Indeed, the redevelopment approach of the LDC relied heavily on entering 
contractual relationship with private developers in construction and provision of 
redeveloped housing. The LDC announced the first batch of eight redevelopment 
projects in 1988, which were all implemented in the form of joint venture with major 
private developers. Due to the financial pressure under prudent commercial principles 
and orientation towards profit maximization driven by its private partners, a number of 
projects kickstarted at early stage were in commercial rather than residential nature 
and they were picked not because they had the worst conditions with the greatest need 
for redevelopment, but because their financial returns were most lucrative. In fact, six 
out of its first eight projects were commercial development. 
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Declining Competencies of the LDC: In Need of a Stronger Tool 
 
 
Even a central redevelopment authority backed by a statute was created to 
expedite urban renewal in Hong Kong, the LDC had been faced with difficulties and 
obstacles. Multiple and scattered ownership spread among high-density buildings 
proved land acquisition a top challenge for the Corporation. The time and cost needed 
for reaching agreement for compensation and sale of ownership were often more than 
expected which caused the projects running behind schedule. Although it could apply to 
the Governor/Chief Executive in Council for land resumption, the prerequisite was to 
convince the government that the LDC had made all possible efforts, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to claim ownership at the project sites. Besides, the LDC shall prove that 
such land resumption was for a public purpose, and it had to prepare assessment that 
arrangements could be made to provide residential accommodation of persons to be 
displaced by the redevelopment proposal. Even upon approval by the Chief Executive in 
Council, land resumption was carried out by the then Planning, Environment and Lands 
Bureau or any authorized person instead of the LDC. The Corporation’s limited authority 
in land resumption had constrained its flexibility in controlling its project progress, and 
the prolonged land assembly process increased its financial burden.   
 
 What is more, the government only offered a $100 million loan to the LDC 
instead of injecting funds to support its operation. The assumption that the LDC could 
run its project in a self-financed way was discouraged by diminishing number of 
available sites for profitable redevelopment and fluctuating property market. When 
there were increasing project delays and the Asian Financial Crisis blew the economy in 
1998, the LDC suffered from enduring financial difficulties in its later years. 
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The problem of urban decay only became more widespread as years went by. By 
the end of 20th century, 8500 urban buildings were over 30 years old, with more than 
2200 of them requiring redevelopment or maintenance. The number of buildings over 
30 years old would be increased by 50% within the next decade. (Tung, 1999). Despite a 
decade’s efforts by the LDC to take up batches of redevelopment projects, the overall 
speed and scale of its redevelopment programme fell well below original expectations. 
During the LDC era from 1988 to 2000, only 16 projects were completed, leaving 10 
commenced projects and 25 announced projects. When the LDC model was found 
unsustainable and ineffective, a change of governance model in urban renewal was 
considered necessary. 
In July 1995 the government conducted public consultation on urban renewal in 
Hong Kong, and a policy statement was published in June 1996 which proposed 
establishing a new statutory authority for taking forward a new urban renewal strategy 
(Planning, Environment and Lands Bureau, 1999). Although the LDC failed to take 
forward effective urban renewal as expected, the government continued to make use of 
a statutory organization to work towards its policy goals in delivering timely urban 
renewal. The tasks of land resumption for redevelopment projects had been proven 
highly complex and sometimes controversial, and the compensation negotiations and 
financial arrangements with different groups of stakeholders in different projects from 
time to time would be more efficiently managed by an independent authority than the 
government with the treasury.  A strong statutory body could therefore act as a buffer 
for the government on one hand and help the government deliver public goods and 
services without increasing recurrent public expenditure on the other hand.  
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Instead of abolishing the organizational tool of statutory body, the government 
tried to create an improved organization backed by a stronger statute which could 
address the vulnerabilities found in the LDC, such as the lack of power in land 
resumption and heavy financial commitment.  In light of this, the Urban Renewal 
Authority Ordinance (URAO) was introduced and passed in 2000, which established the 
Urban Renewal Authority (URA) in May 2001 to replace the LDC which was dissolved at 
the same time.  
 
The URA (2001) as a Stronger Tool: Towards Regulated Self-Governance 
  
The URA took over the work of the LDC which performed as the key 
organisational tool by the HKSAR government in facilitating the city’s urban renewal. 
The URAO states more clearly about the responsibility of the URA in improving the 
standard of housing and built environment of Hong Kong by “replacing old and 
dilapidated areas with new development”, “promoting the maintenance and 
improvement of individual buildings” as well as “preserv(e)(-ing) buildings, sites and 
structures of historical, cultural or architectural interest” (Section 5, URAO). In other 
words, the URA received the legal mandate to revitalize the older part of the city not 
only through land redevelopment, but also encouraging building rehabilitation and 
heritage conservation.   
   
Under the new provisions of planning procedures, instead of submitting 
development proposals on project-by project basis for SPEL’s approval as required by 
the LDC, the URA is obliged to submit a five-year corporate plan and annual business 
plan to the Financial Secretary every financial year which covers details of 
implementation for all its development plans within the period. When the projects are in 
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need of land resumption, the URAO also allows the URA to apply to the Secretary for 
Development requesting him to recommend to the Chief Executive in Council the 
resumption of land in an approved development scheme or project under the Lands 
Resumption Ordinance. However, the threshold for application was lower than that of 
the LDC as the URA can apply direct for mandatory resumption within 12 months after 
the projects plans are given final approval by the Chief Executive or the Secretary for 
Development without requiring it to attempt to require land first. This would give the 
Authority greater power in proceeding to redevelopment projects and thus reduce the 
risk of project delays due to resistance of individual owners.  
 
Besides, the URA is exempt from taxation and land premium, and the government 
injects a total of $10 billion to it as capital investment fund. It is no longer legally bound 
to conduct business according to prudent commercial principles, that now the URA is 
obliged to exercise due care and diligence in the handling of its finance (Section 10(4) of 
URAO).  These provisions have greatly eased the financial burden of the URA compared 
with its predecessor. These differences between the URA and the LDC reflected official 
commitment to improve the institutional design to facilitate the work of the new urban 
renewal agency. 
 
At the same time, by creating a stronger organization, the government expects 
the URA to take up more responsibilities than the LDC. URAO stipulated that the 
government would prepare from time to time an Urban Renewal Strategy (URS) which 
would be reviewed and updated regularly, and the URA shall follow the guidelines set 
out in the URS when it prepares programme of implementation for its proposals and 
projects in the corporate plan.  Subsequently, the first URS was introduced in November 
2001, half year after the birth of the URA.   
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In the 2001 URS, the government has already set the target number of projects 
for the URA, i.e. to complete 200 new projects and 25 uncompleted projects of the LDC in 
20 years, In planning its redevelopment programme, the URA shall give priority to those 
25 projects brought forward from the LDC era, and the URS has designated nine target 
areas for the URA, which are Kwun Tong, Ma Tau Kok, Sai Ying Pun, Sham Shui Po, Tai 
Kok Tsui, Tsuen Wan, Wan Chai, Yau Ma Tei and Yau Tong respectively. The URA was 
required to adopt a “people-centre” approach in urban renewal as the purpose of urban 
renewal is to improve the quality of life of residents in the urban area and reduce the 
number of people who are inadequately housed. Instead of “slash and burn”, urban 
renewal approach shall include redevelopment, rehabilitation and heritage preservation. 
 
When the URS was reviewed and the new version was introduced in February 
2011, it stipulated that the URA had to carry out urban renewal by “people first, district-
based and public participatory” approach, setting more rules and principles to be 
obliged. The government defined the scope of urban renewal to include four elements 
known as 4R - Redevelopment, Rehabilitation, pReservation and Revitalisation, with 
redevelopment and rehabilitation as the two core businesses of URA. New platforms 
such as District Urban Renewal Forum (DURF) would be set up in older urban areas to 
strengthen urban renewal planning with the community at the district level, and new 
roles were assigned for the URA that it would act as implementer in responding to 
building owners’ initiative for redevelopment, or provide assistance to these owners as 
facilitator. In short, the URA as the executive agency of the URS is required to work on a 
number of assigned redevelopment sites on one hand, and steering non-profit-making 
tasks in rehabilitation of aged private buildings, heritage conservation and revitalization 
of historical buildings on the other hand.  
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From the creation of the URA in 2001, it is observed that the type of governance 
in urban renewal in Hong Kong has been changing from cooperative governance in the 
LDC era towards regulated self-governance. The URAO has assigned the URA with 
greater obligations, authorities and resources, especially in the implementation of the 
government’s URS. At the same time, the reconstruction and ongoing management of its 
redevelopment projects still rely on collaboration with private developers, and URA 
would be engaging in various forms of partnering relationship with more public and 
private actors such as bureaux and departments, non-governmental organisations (NGO) 
and civil society organizations (CSO) in its daily operation. These features of stronger 
legal and policy binding in organizing urban renewal and network governance with 
active participation of public and private actors could be broadly categorized as the ideal 
type of regulated self-governance.  
 
Concluding Comments 
 
In the study of urban renewal in Hong Kong, the historical development from 
initial reliance on the market to redevelop older private housing before the 1980s,  
followed by governmental action to establish the LDC in 1988 and then replace it by the 
URA in 2001 have reflected changing patterns of governance in this policy area from 
private self-governance towards cooperative governance and even self-regulated 
governance.  
 
The governance approach in urban renewal of Hong Kong did not start from the 
conventional mode of state intervention probably because Hong Kong had long been 
featured with “laissez-faire”, non-interventionist principle in affairs involving private 
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property interests since the colonial days. The government especially after the 1967 
riots paid much attention to the provision of public housing, and the renewal of private 
housing was left to the private sector. It was when the government alerted that the 
conditions of those aging private buildings became worsened in the 1980s and the 
problem of urban decay rose to public agenda that induced public actors to take part in 
the governance mode of urban renewal. Instead of steering urban renewal by 
bureaucratic structure, the government opted to establish a statutory body as the LDC in 
1988 to encourage private participation in redevelopment projects in the form of joint 
venture. Afterwards, it was due to ineffectiveness of this early model of cooperative 
governance that triggered the government to take steps forward in the extent of state 
involvement, leading to the establishment of the renewed statutory organization as the 
URA in 2001, resembling the model of regulated self-governance. 
 
After understanding why the URA was formed by the government as its policy 
tool in delivering urban renewal, how the government assigned resources to the URA in 
achieving its policy goals in urban renewal would be examined, and to what extent these 
resources have enabled the URA to possess capacity and competencies to fulfil its 
obligations. 
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Chapter Four - Governance and Policy Tools of URA 
 
Introduction 
 
The choice of policy tool is very important in ensuring smooth delivery of policy 
measures.  It also reflects the governance model that government adopts.  In the case of 
urban renewal in Hong Kong, at first, the Hong Kong government had considered that 
leaving private sector alone would be responsive to housing needs of the market  and 
hence it had been reluctant to play an active role in addressing the urban decay problem.  
As discussed in the last chapter, it had been trying to rely on the private sector to tackle 
urban decay problem until it was obvious that relying solely on the private sector could 
not solve the urban decay problem.  The increasing severe urban decay problem had 
pushed the government to be more involved in the delivery of urban renewal. 
 
With the change of governance model towards regulated self-governance, the 
government had established the then LDC and subsequently the URA as its tool to 
deliver urban renewal instead of solely rely on the market.  By choosing “Organisation” 
of Hood’s NATO framework as its policy tool, the government has granted a number of 
resources to enable URA to develop and employ a range of tools.  These range of tools 
would be examined using Vedung’s Carrots, Sticks and Sermons framework. 
 
This chapter examines the resources that the government has granted to URA 
using the NATO Scheme and how it affects the capacity of the URA in employing and 
developing its own tools to delivery urban renewal.   
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The URA as a Dualistic Tool 
 
The choice of a statutory body, the URA, as the organisation to deliver urban 
renewal reflects government’s reluctance on shouldering the delivery of urban renewal 
completely by the government.  The government hopes the position as a statutory body 
outside the government structure would enable the URA to develop and employ its own 
toolkit to deliver urban renewal in a more flexible way while maintaining transparent 
and publicly accountable operations.  Its position as an independent legal entity enables 
it to operate in a commercial manner, including entering into joint venture or 
partnership with private companies, which is inline with government’s long-lived policy 
of “big market, small government”.   
 
URA as Statutory Body 
 
The URA was setup under the Urban Renewal Authority Ordinance (URAO) 
(Department of Justice, 2001), which empowers the URA with the authority to carry out 
urban renewal and associated purposes. As a statutory body, the URA has authority to 
hire its own staff to facilitate its work. This gives the URA flexibility to appoint specialist 
as well as administrative staff with expertise to deliver complex urban renewal related 
works, particularly in land acquisition, planning and design, clearance and project 
management, which are expected to be more competent in project implementation..  
 
A Board of Directors is appointed by the Chief Executive to oversee the work of 
the URA and ensure effective inter-agency coordination with other government 
bureaux/departments in delivering urban renewal within the enabling framework 
established by the URA. The Board comprising 3 executive directors and at least 12 non-
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executive directors (including the Chairman) with appointment for a term not exceeding 
3 years to avoid abuse of powers and to generate fresh ideas for urban renewal.  
Amongst the non-executive directors, four of them are public officers and they are 
Director of Buildings, Director of Home Affairs, Director of Lands and Director of 
Planning.  Since all members are appointed by the Chief Executive, it ensures that the 
direction of the URA is inline with the policy direction of the government. In addition to 
ensuring that the government department and bureaux can discuss and embed urban 
renewal in their business plans through the top-down approach, the platform also 
enhances collaborative governance across the government sector when the URA’s 
redevelopment projects and rehabilitation schemes are being implemented. Top down 
command will also ensure that the public officers communicate and coordinate their 
actions in delivering urban renewal, which is conducive to speeding up the process. 
 
Yet, urban renewal project is very complex which takes a long time from project 
identification through different stages of the project like land resumption, various 
impact assessments, rehousing of affected residents, property development, etc.  For 
example, the K11 project had been initiated in 1976 was only completed in 2009, lasting 
for more than 30 years.  Given this long time-span business nature, the term of three 
years for the Board of Directors is relatively short for urban renewal projects.  The 
change of composition of the Board and more importantly the Chairman may impose 
major shift on project choices and direction of the URA.  The recent resignation of the 
then Managing Director, Miss Iris Tam1, reveals the clash of values with the Chairman 
who took office in 2013 (Urban Renewal Authority,2013).  
                                                        
1 Ms Iris Tam took office as Managing Director of URA since 2006 and she has quit in March 2015 
according to article “Head of Hong Kong's Urban Renewal Authority quits amid 'clash over priorities'” 
published on South China Morning Post on 31st March 2015 (URL : http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-
kong/article/1752068/head-hong-kongs-urban-renewal-authority-quits-amid-clash-over). 
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Amongst the non-executive directors, four of them are public officers and they 
are Director of Buildings, Director of Home Affairs, Director of Lands and Director of 
Planning.  Since all members are appointed by the Chief Executive, it ensures that the 
direction of the URA is in line with the policy direction of the Government. In addition to 
ensuring that the government departments and bureaux can discuss and embed urban 
renewal in their business plans through the top-down approach, the platform also 
enhances collaborative governance across the public and private sector when the URA’s 
redevelopment projects and rehabilitation schemes are being implemented. 
 
Moreove, the URA is subject to scrutiny by the Legislative Council.  The URA 
Chairman, Managing Director and Executive Directors are required to attend meetings of 
the Legislative Council when requested and they shall answer questions raised by 
Council members. This requirement reinforces transparency and accountability in the 
URA’s operations by promoting, expecting the trust between the URA and the public 
would be enhanced when it is more exposed to public scrutiny. 
 
Urban Renewal Strategy: URA as a Tool of Government 
 
 
 
The birth of the URA in 2001 carried a major mission to carry out urban renewal 
in accordance with the government’s official strategy in urban renewal introduced in the 
same year. As stipulated on the URAO, the URA shall follow guidelines set out in the URS 
on the implementation of its projects. This is a clear demonstration that the government 
made use of the URA as its tool to achieve its desired policy goals.   
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The imposition of the URS to the URA was a rather hierarchical as the 
development and review of the URS is responsible by the Secretary for Development. 
Although comprehensive public engagement was conducted during the last review of 
the URS in 2008, the URA as the strategy’s executive agency was only invited as one of 
the attendees in the Steering Committee (Development Bureau, 2011). Its weak 
influence on the development of the new URS may have limited its autonomy in deciding 
the strategic plan more suitable for the URA in implementing urban renewal initiatives. 
 
 The URS announced in 2011 sets out a “people first, district-based, public 
participatory” approach to be adopted by the URA in carrying out urban renewal in 
order to balance the needs and interests of different stakeholder groups.  It also set out 
detailed approach and procedure that the URA shall adopt in implementing urban 
renewal projects.  For example, the procedure for conducting social impact assessments 
is set out in detail in the URS.  On one hand, a very clear set of guidelines could ensure 
the URA to follow all required procedure of the government.  On the other hand, it also 
imposes constraints for the URA to develop its own approach to deliver urban renewal.   
 
 In addition, the URA has been tasked to complete the 25 uncompleted projects 
from the LDC together with 200 priority projects (Planning and Lands Bureau, 2000). In 
addition to setting out the detailed procedures that URA needs to adopt through the URS, 
the government has tasked the URA with a large series of projects to complete.  The URA 
merely serves as an “execution machine” of the government in implementing the series 
of projects.  With reference to the latest report of the URA reported to the Legislative 
Council on 23 June 2015 (Development Bureau, 2015), the URA has commenced a total 
of 57 projects since its establishment and taken over the implementation of the 10 
ongoing projects from the former LDC.  Based on the existing pace, all these 225 projects 
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may take 40 more years to complete.  The URA has already been heavily loaded with 
projects assigned by the government, which leaves very little room for the URA to 
initiate its own projects. 
 
Resumption, Redevelopment and Re-housing with Authority from the 
Government 
 
In order to speed up the land resumption process, the URA has been granted with 
the mandatory resumption power.  The URA could apply for mandatory resumption 
within 12 months after the project plans are approved by the Chief Executive.  The 
application should be made under the LRO.  Although the URA has been granted with 
more authority on resumption, the power is not without limit.  Under the LRO, the 
resumption should be made for public purposes only, such as sanitary or ventilation, etc 
(Department of Justice, 1997).  Although the Chief Executive in Council may decide to be 
a public purpose, the power is not easy to exercise since it may invoke strong resistance 
from the public. 
  
The strong resistance from the civil society imposes challenges for the URA to 
exercise this power.  In the Nga Tsin Wai Village redevelopment project (one of the 25 
uncompleted projects of the LDC) which was announced in 1998, the URA has submitted 
an application to the Secretary for Development requesting the Secretary to recommend 
to the Chief Executive in Council the resumption of land for the project in 2009 but the 
land has still not been resumed yet (Urban Renewal Authority, 2013) (Information 
Services Department, 2013).   
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 In re-housing of residents affected by the redevelopment projects, the URA 
received support from the HA and Hong Kong HKHS that eligible tenants could be re-
housed in units managed by the two agencies.  For example, the HA has agreed to 
allocate 20% of its rental housing to cater for the resettlement needs of the URA (Lai, 
2010).  Nevertheless, since the URA does not have any authority over the HA and HKHS, 
it is difficult for the URA to ensure sufficient rehousing for the affected residents could 
be provided by HA and HKHS.  With more than 270,000 applications (Housing Authority, 
2015) on the queue waiting for public rental housing, the HA is facing tremendous 
pressure to allocate public rental houses to its applicants and hence difficult to cater for 
the needs of the URA.   
 
 Hence, without availability of rehousing units, most of the URA’s effort to assist 
affected flat occupiers to move out from the original site during the course of land 
acquisition has to rely on providing cash compensation and ex-gratia payment to 
affected owner-occupiers and tenants, which has proved to become a tremendous 
financial burden for the URA in the long run. Although the new URS identified the need 
to offer “flat-for-flat” arrangement as an alternative option, the URA’s experimental 
attempt in the site in Kai Tak new development site was yet to be realised. 
 
Treasure from the Government 
 
Recognising the former LDC lacked sufficient financial support, the government 
has injected $10 billion to URA over five-year period.  Instead of adopting “prudent 
commercial principles” (Urban Renewal Authority, 2014) as the LDC, the government 
has imposed less stringent principle on URA in handling its finance.  As stipulated on the 
URAO, the URA is required to exercise due care and diligence in the handling of its 
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finance.  It is also exempted from land premium for its redevelopment sites (Urban 
Renewal Authority, 2014), which is a major cost component of urban renewal.  As at 31 
March 2015, the total amount of land premium waived was $14.3 billion (Development 
Bureau, 2015).  The government has indirectly granted more than double of its initial 
injection through waiving land premium.  Furthermore, under the URAO, the URA could 
borrow from the government or other parties as approved by the Financial Secretary.  
The URA has put in place a MTNP since 2009 in order to secure sufficient funds to 
support its programme.  As at end March 2015, the bond issued was $4.6 billion 
(Development Bureau, 2015).  In sum, financially speaking, the huge sum of financial 
resources have provided the URA with more choices on the selection and employment of 
its own tools.  
 
Information Collection and Dissemination using its nodal position 
 
The URA serves as the central presence of the government in delivering urban 
renewal.  This nodal position enables the URA to collect and disseminate public  
information related to urban renewal from the society for the government.  With the 
improvement of technology, the URA can disseminate information related to urban 
renewal and rehabilitation to the community through websites and mobile apps, such as 
URA’s website, the Building Rehab Info Net, and UR City Fun mobile, etc.  It has also 
setup the Urban Renewal Exploration Centre to provide the public with information 
related to urban renewal, such as the urban decay problem of Hong Kong, the mission of 
the URA, etc.  With more interactions with citizens, it could enable the citizens to better 
understand the urban decay problems that the city is facing and the work of URA and 
hence conducive to trust building and smooth delivery of urban renewal projects.  
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The URA also collects and collates needs and views in the community.  For 
example, it collates redevelopment needs from property owners through demand-led 
scheme and it listens to the needs of the residents of old districts through Community 
Service Partnership Scheme.  These initiatives enable URA to adopt a more bottom up 
approach to deliver urban renewal, which would be conducive to achieving a more 
harmonous and faster property resumption process. 
 
The URA’s Toolkit – Carrots, Sticks and Sermons 
 
As discussed above, the government has given the URA enhanced resources in 
authority, treasure and nodality hand in hand with its assignment to the URA with 
enhanced roles in implementing the official policy in urban renewal. The URA as an 
organizational tool has the capacity to employ its own tools to support the delivery of 
urban renewal as set out under the URS and the URAO. Table 4.1 below summarises a 
wide array of the tools adopted by the URA in delivering redevelopment and 
rehabilitation tasks under the classification of Carrots, Sticks and Sermons (Vedung, et al, 
1998).  
 
Urban Renewal Approach: mix of Carrots and Sermons 
 
From a “people-centered” approach to “people-first, district-wide, public 
participatory” approach as set out in the old and new URS, the URA adopted a mix of 
Carrots and Sermons to cater the interests and needs of different stakeholders for 
promoting sustainable and quality living environment in Hong Kong through urban 
renewal. 
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Table 4.1 Carrots, sticks and sermons employed by the URA to deliver its core business/ entrusted obligations 
 
 Top down initiatives – URA-led 
 Bottom up initiatives –URA to provide support, assistance and allowances to encourage these private-led initiatives  
 Schemes supported by the Urban Renewal Fund (URF) 
 Schemes entrusted to the URA by the government  
 
 Carrots Sticks Sermons 
Redevelopment Compensation Policy  
 Compensation to be given to 
affected owners equivalent to the 
unit rate of a notional 
replacement flat seven-year-old 
situated in similar locality and of 
similar size 
 To accelerate land acquisition 
 
 Mandatory resumption or compulsory 
sale to assemble land  
1. Urban Renewal Authority Ordinance 
Cap 563 
2. Lands Resumption Ordinance Cap 124 
 
 
 
Have flexibility to either adopt Public-
private partnership model to deliver 
the redevelopment schemes or to 
redevelop by other partners such as 
the Housing Society and the Housing 
Authority, with the former being the 
most adopted model. 
  
 Flat for Flat scheme (FFF)  
 Provides domestic owner-
occupiers affected by the URA’s 
redevelopment projects an 
alternative to cash compensation 
and ex-gratia payment  
 Can opt for either ‘in-situ’ FFF 
units in the URA’s new 
development at the original sites 
or for units at a Kai Tak 
Development site earmarked for 
Expression of Interest in Purchasing 
Agreement  
 Affords domestic owner-occupiers the 
priority to purchase new flats in the 
redeveloped site should they wish to 
return  
 
Public engagement and advisory 
 District Urban Renewal Forum 
(DURF) – set up by the 
government to offer urban 
renewal planning advice from a 
holistic and integrated 
perspective 
 DAC 
 Providing public briefings and 
roadshows 
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 Carrots Sticks Sermons 
the FFF scheme  
 To facilitate rehousing thus 
speed up land acquisition 
 Special ex-gratia payment to tenants 
whose landlords terminate or refuse 
to extend their leases after freezing 
survey but before the URA 
successfully acquires the properties 
1. Domestic buildings 
 Improve the conditions of 
tenants in dilapidated buildings  
 Compassionate housing will be 
considered in exceptional 
circumstances  
2. Non-domestic properties 
 Payable to owner-occupiers of 
non-domestic properties  
 Taking into account the number 
of years of their continuous 
operation 
 
Demand-led Redevelopment Project (pilot)  
- domestic buildings  
 Urban Renewal Authority Ordinance 
Cap 563 
 Joint application >50% of owners 
 Building condition within the site 
should be “poor” or “varied” 
 Does not comprise buildings/ 
structures of significant interests  
 Within redevelopment zones 
identified by the DURF and not in 
proposed preservation areas 
 Not within area of a redevelopment 
project commenced by the URA 
 All applications will be screened by 
the URFS 
 Have to be approved by the Financial 
Secretary as viable investment for 
implementation  
  
URF supports the operation of social 
service teams to provide assistance 
for residents affected by the URA’s 
redevelopment projects 
 
 Compassionate Allowance for Elderly 
Domestic Owner-Landlords 
 Eligible owner-landlords who 
Demand-led Redevelopment Project (pilot)  
- commercial and industrial buildings  
 Urban Renewal Authority Ordinance 
URF supports social impact 
assessments and planning studies 
proposed by the DURF 
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 Carrots Sticks Sermons 
rely on rental income to sustain 
their livelihood to receive extra 
allowance 
 
Cap 563 
 To accelerate the pace of renewal of 
dilapidated industrial buildings in 
areas already rezoned to release more 
land for residential or commercial 
development  
 Joint application >50% of owners 
 Building condition within the site 
should be “poor” or “varied” 
 Does not comprise buildings/ 
structures of significant interests  
 Within redevelopment zones 
identified by the DURF and not in 
proposed preservation areas 
 Not within area of a redevelopment 
project commenced by the URA 
 All applications will be screened by 
the URFS and needs to follow the 
relevant occupation permit 
 Have to be approved by the Financial 
Secretary as viable investment for 
implementation  
 
 Provide removal allowance to affected 
tenants of sub-divided units in 
industrial buildings affected by URA 
 URF supports heritage preservation 
and district revitalisation projects 
proposed by NGOs and other 
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 Carrots Sticks Sermons 
redevelopment 
 
stakeholders  
 
 Maintenance cost reimbursement 
scheme  
• Provide ex-gratia allowance to 
encourage owners to carry out 
maintenance and repair works 
for buildings likely to be 
redeveloped soon 
  
    
Rehabilitation  Mandatory Building Inspection 
Scheme (June 2012) 
 Assist owners in complying with 
the statutory requirement to 
carry out inspection of buildings 
once every 10 years 
 
 Urban Renewal Resource Centre to 
provide building rehabilitation 
information and application 
assistance  
 
 Integrated Building Maintenance 
Assistance Scheme (IBMAS) (2011) – 
completely taking over the work of 
Hong Kong Housing Society under the 
Scheme from July 2015 
 Common area repair works 
subsidy 
 Common area repair works 
interest-free loan 
 Also handles applications of  
 Building Maintenance Grant 
Scheme for Elderly Owners 
(administered by HKHS) 
 Building Safety Loan Scheme 
(administered by BD) 
 (both can be applied through the 
IBMAS form processed by the 
URA) 
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 Carrots Sticks Sermons 
 Home renovation interest-free 
loan 
 Owners corporation formation 
subsidy 
 (Building Rehabilitation Loan 
Scheme and Building 
Rehabilitation Materials 
Incentive Scheme in 2004 now 
consolidated under IBMAS) 
 
 
 Third Party Risks Insurance Subsidy  
 Providing a 3-year subsidy to 
Owners Committee after 
completion of repair works  
 
 Partnered with NGOs to offer building 
rehabilitation supporting service to 
owners in various districts 
 
  “Operation Building Bright” scheme 
(2009)  
 URA to contribute $150m to 
support the scheme (in 
collaboration with the HKHS and 
the government) 
 Provide subsidies and technical 
support to owners of dilapidated 
private buildings aged 30 years 
or above 
 Taking over all the building 
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 Carrots Sticks Sermons 
rehabilitation work from the 
Hong Kong Housing Society  
1. Improving building safety and 
cityscape 
2. Creating more job opportunities 
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As a fresh response to the new URS in February 2011, the URA endowed $500 
millions to the Urban Renewal Fund (URF) which operated since August 2011 (Urban 
Renewal Fund) as a standalone “Carrot” that is run by an independent organisation by 
guarantee to provide a steady and independent source of funding for various initiatives 
in line with the URS. The main function of the fund is to ensure that the impact of the 
URA’s projects is mitigated as far as possible, which includes using the fund to support 
social impact assessments and other planning studies as part of scoping and evidence 
base development for better information gathering. As well as supporting heritage 
preservation and district revitalization projects proposed by NGOs and other 
stakeholders, a URF-funded social service team staffed by appointed NGOs was also set 
up to provide assistance for residents affected by the URA’s redevelopment projects to 
promote its social obligations.  
 
In line with the theme of addressing community concerns and aspirations 
through the “district-wide, public participatory” approach, through the use of URA’s 
nodal position, four main “Sermons” are employed in the URA’s toolkit to increase 
transparency of the URA’s operation and to enhance its commitment to public 
engagement.  
 
Firstly mentioned in the first URS in 2001, District Advisory Committees (DAC) 
are set up in seven districts by the URA to understand local urban renewal needs and 
issues. Members of the local community are nominated into the committee to advise 
issues related to urban renewal. It provides a two-way communication channel between 
the stakeholders the URA to improve information dissemination enable holistic district 
wide planning through maintaining a continuous dialogue.  
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Then in June 2011, the government set up the first District Urban Renewal Forum 
(DURF) in Kowloon City to strengthen planning in urban renewal at district level,  The 
URA as a member of DURF make uses of this platform to detect information and enhance 
communication with different sectors of the community. In addition, the URA-funded 
URF approved funding application of Kowloon City DURF in conducting broad-based 
public engagement exercises, planning studies, social impact assessments and other 
related studies to inform its agendas setting and decision making process.  
 
Moreover, as mentioned previously that the URA’s nodal position enables it to 
further improve information dissemination and public education, the URA has 
developed various digital platforms such as websites and mobile apps as well as a 
physical site in the Urban Renewal Exploration Centre to provide necessary information 
about its work on urban renewal in different areas. Besides promoting and educating the 
public about the importance and necessity of urban renewal in Hong Kong, these 
platforms act as sermons for the URA to demonstrate and defend its efforts all along and 
build up an informative, professional and helpful corporate image. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibilities initiatives serves as the last, but by no means 
the least useful, tool used by the URA as an effective outreach tool to promote social 
value and its social responsibility within the community. All these new “Carrots” and 
“Sermons” function together to ensure that the URA can more be effective in responding 
to arising urban renewal issues and addressing the information asymmetry between the 
stakeholders and the authority.  
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Redevelopment: Carrots and Sticks 
 
 
Redevelopment projects have to go through the stage of  land acquisition to clear 
the site for tendering out construction work. To enable successful acquisition of owners 
shares in the project sits, the URA decided to pump more resources to increase the 
power of its “Carrots” than its predecessor.. Instead of awarding affected owner-
occupiers with a notional 10-year flat compensation, the URA enhanced its offer to a 7-
year compensation2 to address LegCo’s concern about the low compensation and to 
increase chances that affected citizens can be relocate within the locality. 
 
Domestic owner-occupiers affected by URA redevelopment projects3 can also opt 
for ‘in-situ’ Flat for Flat scheme4 (FFF) units in the URA’s new development at the 
original sites or for units at a Kai Tak Development site earmarked for the FFF scheme as 
an alternative to cash compensation and ex-gratia payment. As the URA and the 
government anticipated that this alternative “Carrot” would be popular, a total of 484 
flats at the De Novo development in Kai Tak were reserved for the FFF scheme to 
incentivise those affected by URA redevelopment projects to move to development to 
preserve the social network (URA, 2012). Together with various special ex-gratia 
                                                        
2  Compensation to be given to affected owners equivalent to the unit rate of a notional 
replacement flat seven-year-old situated in similar locality and of similar size 
 
3 Only applicable to domestic owner-occupiers affected by URA redevelopment projects 
that are initiated after the adoption of the URS in 2011 
 
4 Domestic owner-occupiers who opt for the FFF must first accept the amount of cash 
compensation calculated on the basis of the value of a notional seven-year-old 
replacement flat. They could then have a choice of 'in-situ' flats situated in the lowest 
five to eight floors in the future new development or flats in an FFF Scheme to be 
developed by the URA on a site at Kai Tak. The unit prices for new flats are fixed at the 
time of the acquisition offer. 
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payments and allowances, it was also hoped that the wider range of “Carrots” may 
encourage affected citizens to accept the acquisition offer much more quickly to reduce 
delays caused by negotiations and rehousing and accelerate the land resumption 
process.   
 
Recognising the value of encouraging stakeholders in tackling the worsening 
urban decay problem in Hong Kong, the Demand-led Redevelopment (Pilot) Scheme was 
introduced as a “Stick” to help the URA to fulfil its obligation to promote the bottom up 
approach in urban renewal set out in the URS adopted in 2011. Under this new scheme, 
the URA may act as an “implementer” to commence a redevelopment project under the 
“owner demand-led” approach pursuant to the its powers set out in the URAO Cap 563, 
or, as an “facilitator” to provide technical assistance to owners where necessary in the 
complicated joint sale process depending on the building owners’ aspirations. No 
acquisition or compensation or resumption will be carried out by the URA in that case.  
 
Alongside that, the Urban Redevelopment Facilitating Services Co Ltd (URFS) was 
introduced as a “Stick” and set up as a subsidiary of the URA to increase the its efficiency 
in dealing with demand-led scheme applications. Though it is running in a small scale at 
the moment, the URA noted that the authority may initiate more of such projects in 
response to demand and would increase its resources in this area accordingly 
(Legislative Council Secretariat, 2015) to enhance the URA’s power to command and 
control the demand-led pilot scheme to promote regulatory efficacy in promoting this 
bottom up initiative within the community. 
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Rehabilitation: Carrots accompanied by Sermons 
 
 
Meanwhile, the new focus on rehabilitation as one of its two core business has 
encouraged the URA to put more focus on using policy tools that could help deliver the 
government’s policy goal to enhance building safety (Development Bureau, 2011). In an 
attempt to speed up its work the URA appointed more staff resources as a key “Carrot” 
to accelerate its pace in delivering its projects. The staff pool has doubled to 500 since 
2009 to deal with the increased workload, particularly in rehabilitation schemes. 
Resources have also been invested in setting up Urban Renewal Resource Centres in 
various districts as “Sermons” to provide building assistance and advice in relation to 
building maintenance to interested parties.  
 
Moreover, various “Carrots” are used to promote rehabilitation by highlighting 
the importance of building inspections and building safety. Notably, the URA now runs 
the integrated and enhanced the Integrated Building Maintanence Assistance Scheme 
(IBMAS) which covers the whole of Hong Kong. Building owners can apply for various 
subsidies and loans available under the IBMAS directly through the URA. In addition to 
increasing the URA’s efficiency in dealing with the rehabilitation-related applications 
and providing advice, this arrangement has helped to remove confusion about which 
government department/ organisations applicants should approach to receive advice 
and assistance in rehabilitation. All these initaitives function to stimulate owners’ 
incentives to refurbish their buildings to enhance building safety and tackle urban decay 
through the bottom-up approach.  
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Concluding Comments 
 
As the governance model change towards more intervention, the government has 
given URA with more resources to enable its delivery of policy measures.  As the same 
time, it has also given the URA with many more obligations. The big series of projects 
assigned to the URA during its setup had already overloaded the authority.  The 
government treats the URA more as its “execution machine” instead a fully autonomous 
body to deliver urban renewal.   
 
A wide range of tools have been developed and employed by the URA in the 
delivery of urban renewal.  Its comprehensive toolkit has enhanced its capacity in the 
delivery of policy measures and thus conducive to achieving the policy goals as set out 
under the URS.  It has also been effective in developing more up-to-date tools to address 
the new focus in the revised URS since 2011. 
 
Yet, though the URA attempted to integrate the “people-centric” ideology in its 
new toolkit to ensure that the URA is ‘open, transparent and publicly accountable’ (URA, 
2011) in tackling urban decay, the URA often criticised as a  profit-oriented agent 
colluding with the private developers, and it becomes the culprit of the destroyed fabrics 
of the older  community. Despite their commitment in designing more innovative policy 
tools to accelerate urban renewal, the URA is under constant attack that they are too 
slow in delivering its role, especially in their redevelopment works. It raises questions 
whether the URA as a dualistic tool has been given and adopted the most appropriate 
tools to undertake its roles, which shall be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five - The URA’s Impact in Promoting and Facilitating 
Urban Renewal 
Introduction 
 
 
Though the URA essentially enjoys a high degree of operational autonomy to 
design its instruments to deliver its roles in urban renewal, choosing ‘the best’ set of 
policy tools to tackle policy problems is an intricate yet essential process in policy 
design and analysis (Doelen, 1998; Kruse and Forss, 2001). Since its establishment in 
2000, the URA has been under constant pressure to be more ‘proactive and imaginative 
in terms of planning and resource utilisation in solving urban deterioration’ (Law, Chan, 
Chui, Wong, Lee, & Chau, 2008). In addition to succeeding its predecessor’s task to 
complete the 25 unfinished renewal projects and 200 priority projects as mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the authority was given a huge responsibility to ensure that it steps away 
from the previous “slash and burn” approach to urban renewal and embrace a more 
people-centric, district-wide policy in undertaking its work to improve the quality of life 
of residents living in old urban areas.  
 
While the greater financial and regulatory powers have enabled the URA to 
benefit 510 buildings under its own rehabilitation scheme up till March 2010 and 
complete 8 of the 52 URA-initiated redevelopment schemes and up till March 2011 
(Development Bureau, 2011), the URA is still considered too slow in tackling urban 
decay in Hong Kong. Considering that the URA will only be able to produce 18,000 flats 
to improve the living conditions of 33,000 people and deliver 37,000m2 of public open 
space and 55,000m2 of government/ institution/ community facilities (GIC) upon 
completion of all of the 52 URA initiated redevelopment projects (Ibid), there were 
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debates (Law, Chan, Chui, Wong, Lee, & Chau, 2008) to re-examine whether the URA 
model is the most optimal mode to deliver urban renewal. It centres on if the 
government should adopt a more laissez faire, market-led approach to urban renewal by 
promoting private self-governance and cooperative governance as put forward by Knill 
and Tosun (2012) as two ideal types of governance to complement or facilitate the 
URA’s works; or a more aggressive interventionist approach to further advance the 
URA’s works by reinforcing regulated self-governance to enhance regulatory efficacy 
and increase the government’s command and control powers in tackling urban decay in 
Hong Kong. This creates pressure for the URA to develop a better range of policy tools 
and use a combination of “push” and “pull” factors to promote and facilitate urban 
renewal   
 
Meanwhile, policy backlash triggered by the Queen’s Pier and Lee Tung Street 
heritage preservation conflict acted as wake-up calls to push the government and the 
URA to engage the public in the government’s agenda setting and delivery processes to 
address the public’s concerns and aspirations in redeveloping, rehabilitating, revitalising, 
and preserving their community and improving the environment. As noted by Doelen 
(1998), the prevailing political thought provided powerful incentives to encourage the 
government and the URA to explore ways to better utilise the government’s “Nodality” 
powers and the URA’s Sermons to engage the public in planning and delivering urban 
renewal proposals to meet the public’s expectations in these areas to avoid further 
policy backlashes. This also helped the URA to acknowledge that they will need to 
develop stronger, more diversified policy tools that will allow them to command and 
control, provide and manage as well as to inform and educate stakeholders to effect 
change more efficiently. 
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Refreshing of the URA’s Approach and a More Comprehensive Toolkit  
 
The URS review conducted between 2009-2011 provided a golden opportunity 
for the government and the URA to step back to reflect Members’ concerns raised during 
the White Bill process and to review their priorities and approaches. It also encouraged 
the URA to re-establish itself as an impartial regulatory body that regards equity and 
inclusiveness, effectiveness and accountability as its key values to promote good 
governance (Knill and Tosun, 2012). The subsequently adopted URS allowed the URA to 
refresh their priorities on redevelopment and rehabilitation and to adopt a ‘people-first, 
district wide, public participatory’ approach in delivering its core business. The diverse 
range of policy tools employed in delivering its new business focus as set out in Chapter 
4 has also strengthened the URA’s ability to exert its influence in the market through by 
utilising the different modes of governance for its benefits. 
 
Promoting collaborative governance in the governance network  
 
In regards to promoting collaborative governance in its work, the URA has in fact 
made good use of the range of Carrots and Sermons in the toolkit to engage stakeholders 
and enhance two-way information exchange and advisory between the organisation and 
its stakeholders. In addition to embedding participatory, consensus oriented planning in 
its problem definition, agenda setting and decision making processes, the URA can also 
showcase its commitment to be accountable, transparent and inclusive in delivering its 
work. Particularly, the URA is considered to be perceptive in using the DURF set up 
under the government’s “Nodality” powers as put forward by Hood (2007) to increase 
the representativeness of its consultative exchange with a cross-session of the wider 
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community. DURF’s ability to convene social impact assessments and other studies will 
also improve the URA’s agenda setting and decision-making process, which in end will 
benefit district-wide, holistic planning of affected areas.  
 
The fact that the URA makes attempts to promote collaborative governance 
under a regulated self-governance framework has a positive effect in reinforcing and 
establishing the URA’s accountability in developing its projects and programmes, which 
in turn will increase the URA’s efficiency in delivering its programmes. The tools 
employed will increase the URA’s ability to manage the engagement process and be 
more responsive to the concerns and aspirations raised through the different 
information dissemination and advisory functions enabled by the URA’s “Sermons”. The 
toolkit’s overall ability to engage and empower the public in the URA’s decision making 
processes will help to increase the legitimacy of the URA’s proposals and make it more 
politically feasible to be delivered, which are key success criteria highlighted by Salamon 
(2000) for good policy tools. This shows that the URA has embraced what Knill and 
Tosun (2012) describe as characteristics of good governance. If carefully delivered, the 
tools will not only be able to support the “People-first, district-wide, public-participatory” 
approach in urban renewal, it will also enhance the URA’s competencies in promoting 
and embracing equity and inclusiveness in its decision making processes to safeguard 
good governance (Knill and Tosun, 2012). 
 
The impact of using cooperative governance to enhance cooperation between the 
government and the private sector in delivering urban renewal  
 
According to statistics, there are approximately 9890 three storeys or more 
private buildings aged 40 years or above in HK in 2013 with old Urban districts such as 
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Yau Tsim Mong (18.8%), Kowloon City (16%), Central and Western (14.8%), Sham Shui 
Po (12.1%) and Wai Chai (11.5%) being the areas that have the highest concentration of 
old buildings in HK. It is estimated that the number of old buildings aged 40 years or 
above will increase annually by about 600 buildings in the next decade (HK government, 
2014). In operational terms, there are 6200 buildings that are 50 years or above in HK, 
40% of which are old depilated buildings that are in urgent need to be refurbished (Ming 
Po, 2015). With the limited resources the URA has in delivering urban renewal, how the 
URA uses the powers and resources given by the government to deliver the 
government’s goals in urban renewal is key. 
 
 
Figure 5:1: Distribution of buildings aged 40 years or above in HK in 2013 
(compiled with data obtained from www.info.gov.hk) 
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Although the URA has much stronger financial support than its predecessor, its 
operating expenditure and redevelopment costs are also huge. The financial situation of 
the URA heavily relies on the sales proceeds of its projects which are very sensitive to 
the situation of the market. For instance, a net operating deficit of $2.3 billion was 
recorded in 2013-14, however, the share of sales proceeds of a number of projects 
managed to turn the deficit into a net operating surplus of $1.1 billion in 2014-15 
(Development Bureau, 2015). Expenditure of the URA is also greatly affected by the 
market, depending on the liquidity of the URA’s assests and the number of projects in 
the pipeline. With both income and expenditure being extremely volatile and sensitive to 
market fluctuations, it is very difficult for the URA to develop long-term plan to deliver 
urban renewal.  
 
One way that the URA tried to maximise its abilities, particularly its financial 
resources, in delivering urban renewal is by utilising what Knill and Tosun (2012) 
described as “cooperative governance” to facilitate collaboration between the 
organisation and the private sector to increase its capacity to deliver multiple projects at 
a time. As confirmed by former Managing Director Iris Tam, the URA is heavily 
dependent on the PPP as a “Sermon” to ascertain that it can recoup its costs quickly after 
the redevelopment to sustain its finances (Hong Kong Economic Journel, 2015). Coupled 
with the fact that the PPP model will allow the URA to obtain higher percentage of 
return from developers if the project is popular and sells well, this triggers intense 
disapprovals that the URA are “profit hungry” (李明生, 2015) as they tend not to work in 
partnership with HKHS and the HKHA in delivering more affordable schemes for the 
public. There are also concerns that the PPP will encourage “interest transfers” between 
the URA and the developers. 
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Yet, using PPP as a Sermon to utilise the power of collaborative governance is 
advantageous in resolving complex societal problems such as urban renewal. While the 
PPP mode will indeed help the URA to gain a higher internal rate of return, PPP’s 
effectiveness in reducing agency costs to spread risks and ensure more efficient delivery 
of the redevelopment scheme should not be overlooked. Though working in partnership 
with government organisations that specialise in delivering housing options for the 
general public, such as the HKHS and the HKHA, may deliver more housing types for 
people, the different policy goals and clientele often make agents hesitant to collaborate 
with each other to avoid conflict within the hierarchical system. Agreeing on division of 
work, financial contributions and subsequent cost reimbursements also contributes to 
problems in promoting inter-agency coordination in delivering the schemes, especially 
for time-sensitive projects such as tackling urban decay.  
 
On the contrary, as the property developers will need to respond to tenders and 
accept the terms set out in contract before entering in a PPP with the URA, the URA faces 
less bureaucracy and interagency coordination issues when compared to government 
agencies and may make implementation much quicker. From the perspective of 
minimising agency costs and costs involved in selecting and implementing a standard to 
ensure compliance as highlighted by Freiberg (2010), the URA is considered effective in 
reducing delays caused by inter-agency coordination. The URA is also seen to be efficient 
in using cooperative governance as a mechanism to maximise its capacity in promoting 
and facilitating urban renewal to make implementation of urban renewal schemes more 
manageable and contribute what Knill and Tosun (2012) regards as a way to promote 
good governance. 
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Nonetheless, by entering into partnership with private developers, URA’s 
autonomy on the project would undeniably be reduced. Private developers are profit 
maximisers by nature. Without surprise, the property developed will tend to be more 
expensive in order generate more profits. Take the Lee Tung Street/ McGregor Street in 
Wan Chai redevelopment project as an example. Though the affected properties were 
resumed at around $4000/ft² by the URA, the redeveloped residential properties were 
sold with a starting price of $20000/ft² (陳紹銘, 2014) when it was first launched, rising 
to an astonishing $30000/ft² in 20155. The high costs/ per ft² is unaffordable for most 
people, especially as the entry selling price was over $6m when it was launched. While 
the Lee Tung Street project proves to be extreme, URA redevelopment projects delivered 
through the PPP rarely goes below the $10000/ft² mark (郭榮鏗, 2015), which makes 
them comparable to luxurious flats delivered by property developers. From that angle 
that the URA is the agent that in charge of assembling land for delivering urban renewal 
as a public good, it does appear to negate the URA’s regulatory efficacy in using its 
powers to improve the quality of life of people in Hong Kong. For this reason, the public 
often question the legitimacy of the URA’s intervention in the market, especially since 
the properties developed are almost in line with prices of private sector developments. 
The tension between increasing efficiency of delivery and ensuring equity in delivering 
value for money public goods will continue to affect the URA’s ability to deliver urban 
renewal.  
 
The public’s concerns about the legitimacy of the URA’s intervention extend 
beyond that however. Criticism that the URA is a ‘greedy, voracious monster’ (楊穎姿, 
                                                        
5 Based on the average “Price per square foot (Saleable Area)” for period from Feb 2015 to July 2015 
retrieved from http://www1.centadata.com/eptest.aspx?type=3&code=SASPWPPYPS&info=&page=0 on 
27th July 2015. 
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2015) is only interested balancing its books raises concern whether the URA has been 
ineffective as a dualistic tool in commanding and controlling urban renewal within the 
regulated self-governance framework, especially in terms of the URA’s use of Carrots as 
incentives to speed up land acquisition.  
 
Is the URA valuably interventionist in delivering the government’s urban renewal 
policies through its toolbox? 
 
Legco members’ concerns about fair treatment to those affected by the URA’s 
redevelopment schemes prompted the government to introduce the seven-year 
compensation obligation and the FFF scheme for the URA to execute when they exercise 
their resumption powers pursuant to the URAO and LRO. They become the core “Carrots” 
that the URA needs to offer to affected parties when they deliver its roles as a dualistic 
tool. In addition to a range of allowances “Carrots” the URA offers to affected parties to 
alleviate the impact of their intervention, the URA must also compensate or rehouse 
domestic and commercial tenants in exercising its “Sticks” to kick start the 
redevelopment process.  
 
Though the Carrots were introduced to ensure that they could alleviate the 
impact of the URA’s projects, they have mixed results. The FFF scheme was introduced 
to reduce the impact on the URA’s finances and to address the social impact of the 
redevelopment projects. As a result, the URA is going to sell 338 properties that were 
reserved for the FFF scheme at 80% the market rate to support the government’s new 
policy focus to increase the supply subsidised housing for the public (Now.com, 2015). 
The obligation to provide a seven-year compensation was adopted when the property 
market was still recovering from the financial crises 2008. Though it was designed with 
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good intent, the high property price in recent years induced a drastic increase in 
compensation to be provided for affected parties. Since 2013, the URA often needs to 
pay above $9,000/ft² to resume land for redevelopment due to the high property price 
in recent yeares. As a point of reference, a $11,020/ft² price was used to resume a 50 
year-old, eight storey building in in Fuk Chak Street in Tai Kok Tsui by the URA in 
September 2013 (Now.com, 2013); however, a record-breaking $13,614/ft² has to be 
compensated to affected owners to resume a site in Anchor Street (Now.com, 2015), 
which is 400m away from the former site (see Fig 2 below). This raises questions about 
the appropriateness of the tools as an intervention strategy.  
 
 
Figure 2: Map showing the proximity of the two resumed sites 
 
 
Looking at the issue strategically, though the are the URA’s “Carrot”, they are the 
executor of the government’s policy to compensate people affected by URA’s 
Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: A study of Governance and Policy Tools  
 74 
redevelopment projects, i.e. the URA is required to use these Carrots in line with 
regulated self-governance framework while it use its “Sticks” to resume land. Therefore  
 
With the property price having doubled since 20096, the inflated compensation is 
likely to enable affected owner-occupiers to be relocated to areas outside of the 
distressed areas, particularly since the compensation offered is significantly higher than 
that of the market price. Though valuably interventionist by nature to promote equality 
to compensate affected owners when the policy tool was designed and adopted, this 
“Carrot” has in fact increased market speculation for properties in old, squalid buildings 
for opportunistic buyers that hope to make a profit from buying the property at market 
price to receive the URA’s generous seven-year compensation. This raises questions 
whether the government’s notional seven-year compensation policy is indeed 
manageable as a tool to promote equity and efficiency in speeding up urban renewal, 
which Salamon (2000) identifies as key characteristics of a good policy tool.  
 
Aside from the increasing debate about the fairness and effectiveness of these 
policies in speeding up renewal, it has put an enormous burden on the finances of the 
URA and impact on how it uses its “Sticks” to resume land to stimulate other urban 
renewal initiatives. The whopping 290%7 increase in the Centacity Index between 2001 
and 2013 makes it increasingly unsustainable for a self-financed statutory body to 
continue providing notional value of a seven-year flat compensation to affected citizens. 
Particularly, the large compensation requires the URA to ring-fence a large amount of 
liquid assets to pay for the compensation. This affects the URA’s ability in planning and 
                                                        
6 With reference to Centa-City Leading Index (CCL), CCL was 145.48 for the week 20th to 26th July 2015 
while CCL was 57.51 for the week 5th – 11th January 2009.  (URL : 
http://202.72.14.52/p2/cci/SearchHistory.aspx) 
7 Centacity Leading Index increased from 40.67 in 2001 to 118.20 in 2013 
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using its resources to support other redevelopment projects, particularly in land 
resumption.  
 
Though the government weaved the URA from paying land premium through its 
“Finance” powers to support the URA’s financial authority, the fact that the resumption 
process may take years puts a toll on the URA’s finances, especially when borrowing is 
involved. As of 31st March 2014, $30 millions alone has been to be made due to an 
increase in rate by 0.5% (URA, 2014). In addition to increasing the risks of these projects, 
long project duration makes it difficult for the URA to recoup its costs to sustain other 
projects. Besides, the heavy financial burden makes it extremely challenging to resume 
land to deliver more strategic projects that could improve the living condition of more 
people and speed up renewal of old areas. For that reason it encouraged the URA to pick 
smaller projects as a strategy to allow a quicker turnaround of resources. It also makes it 
easier for the URA to control project costs and duration from a project management 
prospective when compared to complex projects, such as the ones involving a big area 
or rezoning to increase its efficiency and effectiveness in delivering projects to uphold 
its reputation as an effective agent in delivering urban renewal. This makes the URA 
inefficient as an key government tool to deliver urban renewal, especially as it is highly 
selective in choosing projects that they can manage rather than choosing them based on 
the positive impact it will bring to the wider community in redeveloping the old areas.  
 
With those key observations in mind, it will be beneficial for the government to 
review its compensation policies to ensure it is fair to the general public and is effective 
for the URA to execute. While a compensation should be offered to those affected by the 
URA when it exercises its “Sticks” to resume land, perhaps the government should 
reconsider whether the notional seven-year compensation is still appropriate given that 
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the property price has increased significantly since the policy was adopted. Besides, the 
government will also need  consider whether they should inject more resources into the 
URA through its “Treasure” powers to ensure that the URA has adequate resources to 
deliver its urban renewal work. Not only will this have a positive impact in reducing the 
URA’s pressure to deliver this obligation, it will also increase the URA’s ability to speed 
up urban renewal by freeing up more of its resources to deliver other projects. It will 
also enable the URA to be more valuably interventionist in prioritising and 
implementing initiatives and projects that will benefit the wider community. In 
particular, this will help increase the effectiveness of the Demand-led Redvelopment 
(Pilot) Scheme in promoting and facilitating urban renewal, especially when a strong 
enabling framework has already been established in line with regulated self-governance 
to realise the ideals of the URS.  
 
Establishing an enabling framework to implement the demand-led redevelopment 
pilot scheme to support bottom-up approach to urban renewal 
 
The Demand-led Redevelopment (Pilot) Scheme was introduced as a “Stick” to 
encourage stakeholders to take a more active role in tackling urban deterioation 
through collaborative governance. Since July 2011, only 11 of the 110 demand-led pilot 
schemes application were selected and commenced from the three rounds of demand-
led redevelopment scheme (URA, 2014). The URA noted that limited resources meant 
that they have to be highly selective of the schemes they will be involved. In line with its 
obligation to be “financially prudent” in its decision making, as the URA will incur an 
average of $0.3bn loss for every demand-led project they are involved in (Wong & Fung, 
2015), the URA emphasised that they could only take on 1-2 projects demand-led 
redevelopment projects per year (URA, 2011).  
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Moreover, the URA introduced new criteria to increase its regulatory efficacy in 
delivering its policy goal. To satisfy the selection criteria of the 4th round of the demand-
led redevelopment scheme, all buildings within the site must be classified as “Poor” or 
“Varied” to qualify. Scores will be deducted for applications that involve buildings with 
non-compliance building orders issued by the Buildings Department (URA, 2015). The 
minimum size for applications site was increased from 400m² to 700m² to ‘enhance the 
planning gain and efficiency of floor layout for the redevelopment’ to benefit the wider 
community (URA, 2014). They noted that a third of applications from the previous 
rounds are above 700m² threshold so this modification is simply acting as a natural 
filter for smaller schemes (鍾雅宜, 2015). The URA also raised the application threshold 
from 67% to 80% to ensure it can engage more property owners at an early stage to 
increase the success rate of the scheme8. The URA argued the new criteria is to increase 
chances for the schemes to be delivered which will help to avoid wasting URA’s 
resources and reduce project risks (Wan Wei Po, 2015).  
 
Though the URA may have improved their efficiency of its “Stick” in delivreing 
the pilot scheme, it has reduced its legitimacy in meeting the aspirations of the public as 
set out in the URS. The URA denied that the new requirements were introduced to avoid 
investing in non-profit making projects, particularly as they have increased the relevant 
                                                        
(i)  filed within the appeal period or if an appeal is filed, the dismissal of appeal, within 
one year of the offer.     (URA, 2015) 
1. of URA's conditional offers and signing of Agreements for Sale and Purchase by 
owners of no less than 80% of undivided shares of each lot in the application within 
the specified offer period and;  
2. the Secretary for Development's authorisation of the project and no appeal is filed 
within the appeal period or if an appeal is filed, the dismissal of appeal, within one 
year of the offer.     (URA, 2015) 
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project selection weighting on building conditions from 30% to 50% to prioritise 
buildings that would benefit the most from the pilot scheme (HKCD, 2015). Yet, the 
URA’s decision to eliminate smaller sites in their facilitation programme has attracted 
criticisms that the URA is reneging on the promise to adopt a ‘people first, district-based 
and public participation approach’ (URA, 2014) to address the problem of urban decay. 
NGOs were quick to condemn the URA for acting against their social mission to assist 
people who would benefit the most from the urban renewal services as a public good.  
 
Although it is understandable that public services are under pressure to deliver 
more with less resources, the URA should focus on how many people can benefit from 
the redevelopment scheme and how the scheme will help ‘strengthen the socio-
economic and environmental fabric for the benefit of (the) urban communities’ (URA, 
2002). It is these kind of small-scale projects that would actually benefit most from 
URA’s intervention as private developers are usually not interested in projects that are 
small scale and/ or not profitable.  
 
By accepting the small-scale demand-led schemes the URA will promote 
economic efficiency and encourage more bottom-up initiatives from the community to 
redevelop old buildings in areas with worst state of decay, such as in Yau Tsim Mong, 
Sham Shui Po where most of the buildings are built in the 1950s and are in urgent need 
for refurbishment or redevelopment. Old buildings in these two districts in particular 
are saddled with sub-divided flat problems as the poor and vulnerable groups could not 
afford to live in more decent places. Many of these older buildings are with scattered 
ownership, badly maintained and are expensive in making them compliant to current 
building safety and fire safety requirements. Without the URA’s intervention there is 
little hope that these old buildings can be redeveloped as tenants are keen to move out 
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and would not invest in maintaining the buildings in hopes of the BD’s intervention to 
declare it unsafe for habitation. The quality of life of people living in small, old squalid 
buildings will only worsen overtime with little chance of being redeveloped.  
 
This problem runs deeper than simply failing to help those who needed help the 
most. Some residents indicated that they had been approached by private developers 
but have declined to work with private developers to redevelop their plot in hopes of 
being selected by the URA. Apart from compensation matters, they expressed strong 
reservations about working with property developers and felt that it is ‘much safer to be 
acquired by the government’ (i.e. the URA) than by private developers (Ming Po, 2015). 
Most residents living in these old buildings are elderlies and are more comfortable 
working with an agent with delegated authority from the government to impose 
sanctions and provide for the public good rather than for private interests. Considering 
that, the new criteria are, in fact, deviating from the original goal of the pilot scheme to 
build upon the collaborative governance framework to promote “self-help” to improve 
citizens’ the quality of life. While the adjustments to “rules of the game” makes it more 
manageable for the URA to execute, it reduces its effectiveness in promoting good 
governance within the system (Knill and Tosun, 2012).   
 
Aside from affecting the public’s trust in the programme, these new 
arrangements also raise questions regarding the core value of the URA – whether the 
statutory body rates maintaining financial sustainability much more strongly over its 
stipulated mission to tackle urban decay and improve the quality of life of residents in 
HK. By increasing the thresholds for consideration, there is general suspicion that the 
URA is using the system as a mechanism to alleviate chances that it needs to select 
projects that would lead to huge losses and minimise chances of them using the relevant 
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“Sticks” and “Carrots” to commence the selected projects. Most agreed the high 
thresholds are merely a tactic to deter applicants from applying rather than having a 
direct impact in increasing the URA’s effectiveness in delivering the pilot scheme. Some 
editors even went as far as saying that the new thresholds is a number game that help 
the URA to filter out most schemes and provide the URA a “convenient getting out clause” 
in terminating the demand-led scheme as the project in itself is investment-heavy and 
non-money making (吳家鎚, 2014).  
 
Analysing from a land administration point of view, this mechanism does appear 
to favour the URA in filtering out small land plots or sites that have already used up the 
maximum permitted plot size for development and they cannot benefit from increasing 
its plot: redevelopment floor space ratio. Former Manager Director Tam also admitted 
just before she left office in May 2015 that the small plot: redevelopment floorspace 
ratio and the fact that these old buildings are dispersed makes it unviable for the URA to 
be involved in to facilitate many of the bottom-up schemes (Ming Po, 2015). This raises 
concerns that the URA is more anxious about loss limitation rather than it is not feasible 
to work on smaller plots. This has not only negated the URA’s effectiveness in using this 
“Stick” as an positive intervention strategy in the market, it has also reduce the URA’s 
accountability and legitimacy in delivering this bottom-up initiative. 
 
The URA should acknowledge the aim of the initiative is to assist buildings 
owners who are keen to redevelop the buildings; and the target buildings should be 
those that are unprofitable and have little chance to be redeveloped unless the URA gets 
involved in. Buildings with floorspace above 700m² have relatively high potential to be 
redeveloped through the market force and should not be the target beneficiaries of the 
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demand-led redevelopment pilot scheme. As noted by Dr Law Chi-kwong, a specialist in 
renewal issues at University of Hong Kong, building condition and the project’s impact in 
improving the quality of life of those residing in the building should be the key 
consideration of the URA in getting involved in demand-led pilot schemes rather than 
the plot size and profitability (Wong, 2014). The obsession with driving down 
acquisition costs and maximising surplus plot ratio from old buildings to build luxury 
buildings will only attract further criticisms from the public and increase calls to hold 
the body to its social obligations (Yeung, 2015).  
 
Moreover, stakeholders, including Councillors, are concerned that none of the 
demand-led projects have been completed and the URA is already declaring the scheme 
unsustainable, 4 years into the scheme. Coupled with the issues discussed above, this 
does raise serious questions about the integrity of the URA in implementing the 
initiative and carrying out its “implementer” role stipulated in the URS. In the URS 
consultation in 2011, different stakeholder groups including influential professional 
bodies and think tanks, civic groups, property developers groups and individuals 
already expressed their grave concerns that the URA’s self-financing model is 
unsustainable and model will lead to policy inclination which departs from public 
expectation (Development Bureau, 2011:18-20). This reduces the URA’s credibility in 
establishing this programme to ensure that it provides a robust platform to enable the 
bottom up approach.  
 
Nonetheless, the government’s failure to fully appreciate the pressure it is 
putting on the URS to deliver the pilot scheme without extra resources is the ultimate 
push factor for the URA to increase the thresholds to limit its involvement in the pilot 
scheme. Even though the demand-led redevelopment scheme is pilot by nature, the 
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government should recognise that extra resources should be given to the URA to deliver 
schemes, especially since it will take at least five – eight years based on the URA’s own 
redevelopment projects from commencement to completion (宋嘉平, 2015) to deliver 
any redevelopment project.  
 
The government, as well as the URA, should also acknowledge that the scheme is 
a welcoming initiative to kick-start the self-help mentality to capitalise on the 
instrument’s potential ability to enhance collaboration within the governance network.  . 
Moreover, it is also premature to axe the demand-led scheme purely on cost terms, 
especially since the demand-led projects only has a 18% failure rate9 and is relatively 
low-risk compared to other URA-initiated renewal projects. As the Chief Executive 
recognised that demand-led scheme had received ‘an overwhelming response from 
property owners’ (Legislative Council Secretariat, 2015), the URA, as a dualistic tool, 
should be more proactive and consider seeking capital funding (“Treasure”) from the 
government to expand the scheme and ensure the continual implementation of the pilot 
scheme. Though some may argue that this is using public money to directly subsidise 
private initiatives, if these bottom up projects could make better use of the existing 
brownfield sites and bring substantial benefit to the wider community the government 
should consider this as a worthwhile investment. This will have positive effect in 
accelerating the governance network’s ability and capacity to tackle urban decay and 
improve the quality of living of those in old districts in a sustainable manner. This in 
return will help to relieve the URA from its financial constraints to pursue their other 
initiatives and increase its influence in the regulated self-governance network to 
promote collaborative governance. The enhanced relationship will be beneficial in 
                                                        
9 2 of  the 11 selected schemes did not materialise 
Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: A study of Governance and Policy Tools  
 83 
solving the urban deterioration problem in Hong Kong through the collective force, such 
which will also form a cascading effect to help promote private-self governance within 
society to contribute to urban renewal.   
 
Utilising private-self governance to support its role in promoting Rehabilitation in 
Hong Kong 
 
The new focus on rehabitalition as one of its two core business has encouraged 
the URA to put more focus on using policy tools to meet the government’s policy goal to 
enhance building safety (Development Bureau, 2011). Functionally speaking, this will 
increase the URA’s ability and capacity to enhance its effectiveness to promote private-
self governance in the network. However, it is noted that the government has not 
provided the URA with extra resources and powers to enable the URA to deliver these 
additional functions more effectively. Though the URA has employed double amount of 
staff to cope with the extra workload associated with the government’s rehabilitation 
initiatives, the URA is seen to be relatively passive in using its tools to promote 
rehabilitation.  
 
Since the URA inherited and expanded the IBMAS scheme in July 2015, the URA 
has increased the barrier to entry which makes buildings under twenty years of age 
much harder to receive the grant to facilitate refurbishment works. From the 
perspective of promoting good governance, the URA should not be increasing the barrier 
to entry so quickly, especially since they have just taken over the responsibility for 
delivering this scheme across Hong Kong. The action may frustrate the public and 
contribute to the negative image that the URA is only concerned about reducing their 
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financial burden from running the scheme rather than helping those who would benefit 
the most from the initiatives.  
 
If the government is keen on using the URA as a dualistic tool in promoting 
rehabilitation, the government should consider providing the URA with more “Finance” 
to create incentives for the URA to use this “Carrot”. It will also increase the 
government’s effectiveness in using URA as a tool through  “Organisation”  as per Hood’s 
policy tools framework to promote rehabilitation in the long run. In addition to 
delivering a more sustainable form of urban renewal by stimulating private interests in 
carrying out refurbishment works, the increased attractiveness of the URA’s “Carrots” 
will help to further extend the building life and avoid deterioration to tackle the problem 
of urban decay at its core. This will help to reduce the government and the URA’s burden 
in the long run if more private owners and the residents living in the buildings are 
interested in the upkeep of their buildings and ensure that they are up to the building 
standard. While the reimbursement might be small and not a “juicy” Carrot, it serves as a 
small “bait” to help encourage owners and residents who were thinking about 
refurbishing the building anyway to take benefit from the scheme to carry out the works 
earlier. This will be a win-win situation for all parties involved, especially for the 
government as it will help to promote private-self governance amongst citizens to invest 
in their buildings, which reduces the government’s cost in the long run in using 
redevelopments as a key means to promote urban renewal. This will also make the 
URA’s task to deliver rehabilitation much more managable to increase the effectiveness 
of the URA as a tool used by the government to achieve it’s policy goal to promote 
building safety.   
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Moreover, IBMAS can also help to reinforce the URA’s position as a key 
rehabilitation promoter. The “Carrots” can help to reduce the need for demolition and 
redevelopment of tired buildings that only require a facelift to revamp the area.  Though 
some are interested in getting their buildings redeveloped by the URA to obtain the 
seven year compensation, it should be acknowledge that most find it difficult to leave the 
established, cherished community ties and find it a nuisance to be removed away from 
familiar surroundings. This is particularly applicable for owners that do not wish to sell 
their share of ownership or if some of the residents prefer to remain in the familiar 
surroundings, such as elderlies, when the building fully meets basic health and building 
safety standards. In order to make better use of IBMAS as a potentially powerful policy 
tool to further expedite urban renewal efforts, the URA should first re-examine the 
powers granted to the authority to tie in with their roles and responsibilities in 
delivering redevelopment and rehabilitation. Rather than delivering the programmes in 
separate silos as per the present setting, the URA can re-jiggle the programmes into top-
down initiatives and bottom-up initiatives for better alignment of powers to deliver the 
respective schemes. This will make it more efficient to reassign – or even re-design – 
different policy tools to the respective initiatives to make it more effective for the URA to 
assign resources to help building owners as well as residents to maintain and/ or 
renovate their building.  
 
As it is much more affordable to renovate and retrofit old buildings to bring them 
up to the fire and health and safety standards, the URA can utilise its capacity as the lead 
authority in promoting rehabilitation to request the government to inject more 
resources in the IBMAS to encourage building owners and residents to maintain their 
buildings to extend the life of the buildings further. This will have the added benefit of 
increasing the inter-agency coordination between the URA and the BD in tackling the 
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issue of old, dilapidated buildings and promoting a clearer distribution of duties 
between the two bodies in tackling urban decay issues. Through the multi-dimensional 
approach compromising public education, financial and technical support as already put 
in place through the URA’s “Sermons”, it is believed that the URA will be more effective 
in promoting the importance of maintenance and encourage bottom-up approaches to 
urban renewal to foster a safe and sustainable living environment in Hong Kong. 
Combined with enhanced use of sermons to advocate and educate the public about the 
advantages of IBMAS scheme as an alternative over the demand-led scheme, it will 
potentially help more buildings that did not quality for the demand-led scheme to 
pursue the “self-help” initiative to improve their quality of living. The building owners 
will also be under less pressure to cooperate with property developers and sell their 
properties if they wish to improve their living conditions but do not want to move away 
from the community. This will not only increase the URA’s responsiveness in delivering 
the rehabilitation initiatives, it will also promote private-self governance effectively as 
Knill and Tosun (2012) proposed to reduce the need for top-down intervention to 
enable urban renewal.  
 
Compared to redevelopment which involves long term demolition and 
construction works, rehabilitation works is more palatable in comparison and causes 
much less disruption to the residents, businesses and the wider community. Provided 
that more buildings within the old urban areas choose to pursue the IBMAS, the 
programme will have a positive impact in contributing to the preservation of the 
community and the architectural characteristics of the area, which is unique and not 
replicable in small scale, project-based redevelopment projects. It will also serve as a 
powerful catalyst and lead to gradual, but organic revitalisation of the urban area as the 
area begins its transformation. This is quicker and much more cost-effective way to 
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address urban decay to help achieve sustainable development and uphold the long-term 
vision to urban renewal in Hong Kong, which is the ultimate mission and goal of the URA 
and the Hong Kong government. This will also allow the URA as a statutory body to fully 
deliver its duties in accordance to their mandate and fulfil their social mission to 
promote and facilitation urban renewal in the most economically viable, financially 
sustainable manner.  
 
Concluding Comments 
 
As a dualistic tool used by the government in promoting and facilitaing urban 
renewal, the URA is, overall, considered effective in using the powers imparted by the 
government in delivering a wide range of Carrots, Sticks and Sermons to accelerate 
urban renewal in Hong Kong. As demonstrated in the analysis, the URA has in fact 
invested significant resources in ensuring that it adopts the “people-first, district-wide, 
public participatory” approach in its work. It appears that URA have also made due 
regard to promoting good governance in constructing this toolbox, especially in 
increasing the efficiency in speeding up its work. Great care was also seen in enhancing 
the legitimacy of its decision making process to increase its accountability by 
establishing a robust, enabling framework to enhance communication between the URA 
and the stakeholders to address information assymtery through a combination of 
“Carrots” and “Sermons” to promote collaborative governance..  
 
Though the URA have establised enabling frameworks in line with regulated self-
governance, the URA is not seen to have effective as a dualistic tool in delivering the 
policy tools entrusted by the government in delivering. This is particularly the case for 
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using situations where finance is a key consideration in delivering the initiatives. The 
need to operate on a ‘financially prudent’ principle is often in conflict with the URA’s 
intention to deliver “people-centric”, holistic urban renewal proposals, which has 
affected the toolkit’s effectiveness in delivering the URA’s social mission. This induces 
the URA to use the “do minimum” approach to ensure that it fulfils its obligations while 
delivering as few initiatives as reasonably practicable to reduce their impact on the 
URA’s finances. This is characterised in the URA’s attitude in delivering the demand-led 
redevelopment scheme and the rehabilitation initiatives.  
 
Urban Renewal in Hong Kong: A study of Governance and Policy Tools  
 89 
Chapter Six – Observations, Findings & Conclusions 
Introduction  
 
Hong Kong is a small place with a hilly landscape.  Less than 7% of its land is 
being used for residential purposes (Planning Department).  The highly dense 
population imposes great challenges for the government on rehousing affected citizens 
due to the need of re-development.  Scattered ownership further adds difficulties for the 
government to resume its land for re-development.  The urban decay problem has 
become more and more serious and the pace of urban renewal has long been 
unsatisfactory.  If building dilapidation continue its pace, Hong Kong would soon become 
unsafe to live in. 
 
 The Hong Kong government has established the then LDC and subsequently URA 
with a view to speeding up the urban renewal process.  In the course of the urban 
renewal, the government hopes the URA could balance the needs of preservation and re-
development while maintaining its financial sustainability.  Though the government has 
tried provided the URA with more financial support and authority, URA still faces many 
challenges and difficulites in delivering urban renewal.  This project attempts to analyse 
how the governance model of the URA and tools it adopts affects the effectiveness on 
delivering urban renewal.  This Chapter concludes the major findings of the project and 
to summarise feedback to the resaerch questions. 
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Research Questions Revisited: Significant Obervations 
 
The project started with the question on governance approaches and policy tools 
available to governments for addressing the needs of urban renewal.  The Hong Kong 
government had initially adopted private self-governance model to deliver urban 
renewal against urban decay until it was proved market force alone could not tackle the 
problem.  When it decided to engage in influencing the scale and scope of  the city’s 
redevelopment by setting up the LDC in the late 1980s, a more cooperative governance 
model was adopted by the government who wished to utilise “market intelligence” in 
order to drive the engine of urban renewal without committing long term financial 
support. Since then, the mode of governance in this policy area has become featured 
with political steering by interactive policy networks involve both the state and the 
private actors. 
 
 With respect to policy tool, the government has chosen to adopt a statutory body 
(i.e. the then LDC and URA) as its tool to deliver urban renewal.  The position as an 
independent statutory body outside the government structure enables the employment 
of policy tools in a more flexible way while maintaining highly transparant and publicly 
accountable operations. 
 
 As a policy tool, the government has granted the URA with a number of resources 
(i.e. Vedung’s carrots, sticks and sermons embracing elements of nodality, treasure and 
authority of Hood).  As the governance model changes towards more intervention, the 
government has added more resources to the URA.  The increase in resources gives URA 
more flexibility on developing and employing its own tools to deliver urban renewal 
more effectively and thus enhance it’s capacity.  However, at the same time, the 
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government has assigned the URA with more roles and responsibilities, hoping that the 
URA would be able to deliver with the increased resources.  
 
The increased resources from the government has allowed the URA to develop a 
wider range of “Carrots”, “Sticks” and “Sermons” to enhance its powers to command and 
control, to provide and manage incentives as well as to to enhance two-way education 
between the the URA and the stakeholders. Finance, however, has a significant effect on 
the URA’s ability to use the capacity of the different governance mode to achieve its 
missions. To enhance the effectiveness and responsiveness of the URA as a dualistic tool 
in delivering urban renewal, the government should impart more of its “Finance” tools 
to allow the URA as “Organisation” under Hood’s classification to deliver its roles more 
effectively. It will help the URA to deliver its roles more effectively and efficiently and 
increase its accountability and legitimacy in performing its duties. 
 
Major Findings  
 
The URA has considerable capacity in delivering urban renewal.  The increase in 
resources has increased URA’s capacity in delivering urban renewal as compared to the 
LDC.  As at March 2015, the URA has commenced a total of 57 redevelopment projects, 
three preservation-cum-revitalisation projects in addition to 10 ongoing projects from 
the then LDC  (Development Bureau) since its establishment in 2001.  In LDC’s 13 years 
of history, it had only delivered 25 projects (Law, Chui, Wong, Lee, & Ho, 2010).  From 
these figures, the URA has actually speeded up the urban renewal process.  However, it 
shall be noted that the target set in the Urban Renewal Strategy back in 2001 was to 
redevelop 2,000 buildings in 20 years (i.e. 100 buildings per year) while it has only 
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completed redevelopment of 293 projects as at June 2015 (i.e. around 20 buildings per 
year).  (Law, Chui, Wong, Lee, & Ho, 2010) (Development Bureau, 2015)  In other words, 
the URA is still far from achieving the original target set by the government.  An in-depth 
study is therefore essential in order to understand the problems URA is facing so that 
improvement measures could be derived.   
 
 Furthermore, financial sustainability has forced URA to operate on commercial 
principle.  As revealed by media on the recent resignation of the then managing director 
of URA Ms Iris Tam, the Chairman had intended to outsource URA’s acquisition 
department by entering into partnership with Richfield Realty to speed up the 
resumption process and he hope to change the current compensation policy of paying 
affected owners with the price of a seven-year old flat in the same locality (Wong & Xu ) 
in order to balance its book.  Since URA is a statutory body established by the 
government and a huge sum of public money has already been injected, citizens expect 
URA focus more on its social objectives rather than putting profits on top of its agenda.  
However, it is not easy to achieve its social objectives while maintaining financial 
sustainability.  In order to ease URA’s financial burden, more government support or 
adoption of a more innovative financial arrangement would be required. 
 
 The URA has been tasked with both re-development and preservation.  On one 
hand, it is easier for one organisation to consider either to re-develop or preserve 
dilapidated buildings from a holistic view.  On the other, it is very difficult to maintain a 
delicate balance between re-development or preservation, especially for an organisation 
which requires to maintain its financial sustainability.  Preservation projects are usually 
costly and unable to generate profits.  In order to maintaining its financial sustainability, 
it would be more favourable for the URA to select re-development projects rather than 
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preservation ones.  Out of the 57 redevelopment projects URA has commenced, only 7 of 
them contain preservation elements and there are only 3 preservation-cum-
revitalisation completed (Development Bureau, 2015).  These figures tells us the fact 
that URA actually puts more focus on re-development, rather than preservation.  The 
Development Bureau is actually responsible for policy on development-related heritage 
preservation and it has implemented a few schemes to support preservation of historic 
buildings, such as the “Revitalising Historic Buildings Through Partnership Scheme” and 
“Financial Assistance for Maintenance Scheme”. (Development Bureau) (Commissioner 
for Heritage's Office)  In order to ease financial burden of the URA, the government may 
consider to utilise other organisation, such as a government department, to deliver 
preservation rather than URA. 
 
 Redevelopment has always been more difficult than building from scratch.  
Difficulties in urban renewal not only limit to the governance and policy tools of URA.  
Some other factors which are specific to Hong Kong also increases difficulties on urban 
renewal.  The scattered ownership of property makes it difficult for the URA on 
resuming the land.  The high property price puts a big financial burden on URA in land 
resumption.  These difficulties could not be resolved without more intervention by the 
government. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The study discusses how the evolution of governance model affects the resources that 
the government allocates to address the urban decay problem.  It also study URA’s 
capacity to develop or employ its own tools to deliver urban renewal and also the 
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effectiveness of tools it employed.  Constraints that URA faces on using the resources 
granted, which would affect its capacity to fullfil its obligations, have also been visited.  
However, the study does attempt to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the URA on 
achieving the missions as set out under URS. 
 
Since the study relies solely on desktop research, it is limited to the information 
available publicly, such as LegCo papers, newspaper clippings, annual reports of the URA, 
official documents of the government, etc.  No interview with officials in the URA has 
been conducted and no internal documents have been obtained.  As a result, no first-
hand information has been included in the study.  Accuracy of figures quoted solely 
relies on second hand information stated on official documents or information available 
publicly.   
 
 Urban decay is a complicated problem which cut across different policy areas, 
such as building safety, town planning, preservation, social welfare, etc.  It possesses 
some nature, if not all, of a wicked problem and there is no easy solution.  Noting the 
problem of urban decay could not be addressed without more intervention by the 
government, the government has already deployed more resources in order to speed up 
the pace of addressing the problem.  Though the pace of re-development has been 
speeded up after the establishment of URA in some sense, it is still unable to catch up 
with the pace of building dilapidation.  It is necessary to carry out a comprehensive 
review on roles and responsibilities of the URA and achievements and challenges of it 
with respect to the resources granted in order to identify an improved arrangement to 
deliver urban renewal. 
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